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Network Equality
Olivier Sylvain
One of the clear goals of the federal Communications Act is to ensure that all Americans
have reasonably comparable access to the Internet without respect to whom or where they
are. Yet the main focus of policymakers and legal scholars of Internet policy today has
been on promoting innovation, a concept that Congress barely invokes in the statute. The
flagship regulatory intervention for this approach is “network neutrality,” a rule that
forbids Internet providers from blocking or interfering with users’ connections. To the
extent that net neutrality addresses the distributional goals of communications law, it
posits that openness will foster innovation which, in turn, will draw user interest which, in
turn, will induce investment in more and better infrastructure which, in turn, will benefit
today’s underserved. This is the trickle down theory of Internet innovation.
This Article critiques this approach. While it has its merits, the privileging of innovation in
communications policy could exacerbate existing racial, ethnic, and class disparities
because the quality of users’ Internet connections refract through those persistent
demographic variables. This Article calls for a return to the distributional equality principle
at the heart of communications law and policy.
The Internet is essential to almost every aspect of our lives. Like electricity a century ago,
it is a technology that determines how we work, campaign, exercise, learn, heal, and love.
The benefits of a high-quality Internet connection are especially importantindeed more
importantfor racial minorities, poor people, and all others who must negotiate
structural inequalities in other aspects of their lives in ways that advantaged people do
not. Policymakers and scholars accordingly must affirmatively further equality in Internet
access, or at least adopt a regulatory approach that seeks above all to ensure equality. The
Internet is too indispensable to rely on innovation alone.

 Fordham University School of Law, Associate Professor of Law. I am grateful to Joshua
Breitbart, Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Nestor Davidson, Heather Gate, Abner Greene, Clare Huntington,
Olati Johnson, Sonia Katyal, Joe Landau, Ron Lazebnik, Robin Lenhardt, Bruce Lincoln, Kimani
Paul-Emile, Joel Reidenberg, Aaron Saiger, Andrew Selbst, and Maya Wiley for constructive
conversations during the writing of this Article. I owe thanks to participants in the October 2014
Silicon Harlem Annual Conference and the November 2014 CRT/Empirical Methods Conference at
Fordham Law School where I presented the ideas that eventually found themselves in this paper. I am
also grateful to Christopher Bavitz and the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law
School for hosting my talk on this paper in July 2015. Danielle Efros provided essential research
assistance. Finally, I am indebted to Sarah Jaramillo for her unwavering cheer and research support.
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Introduction
The Internet can be a great equalizer. It enables far-flung, underserved,
and oppressed communities to share ideas, products, and services with
anyone around the world. It creates connections for people who would
otherwise be isolated. We have seen this happen everywhere, from Red
Hook, Brooklyn in the wake of Hurricane Sandy to remote mountain
villages in San Juan Yaee, Oaxaca to the homes of chronically ill
elementary school students in Sumter, South Carolina to the post-
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election protesters in the streets of Tehran, Iran. The Internet can be a
gateway to a vast world otherwise beyond users’ reach. In this way, it can
be a great democratizing and leveling force.
But this is only half of the story. For the Internet to be a platform
for communicative integration, all users must have reasonably comparable
Internet access. Otherwise, the disadvantage that remote and underserved
communities already experience will only worsen.
This has been true for most communications and general use
technologies. Indeed, universal service was the objective for which
Congress wrote the Communications Act over eight decades ago. The
prevailing communications technologies were different then, of course.
But the statute’s objective was clear: lawmakers prioritized universal
2
deployment in the broad terms. This remains true. Congress has only
clarified this central aim over time. Today, policymakers must ensure
that the benefits of the newest communication technologies are “ma[d]e
available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States without
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or
3
sex.” The statute, moreover, puts the level of broadband service that
policymakers must make available to all users in relative terms; it
requires that access and fees charged be “reasonably comparable” no
4
matter whom or where users are. These distributional principles must
guide communications policymaking above all else.
Despite this clear command, communications policymakers and
legal scholars in the United States today overwhelmingly focus on
5
ensuring that the Internet is a platform for innovation. And, in so doing,
they might be complicit in perpetuating existing disparities in availability,
adoption, and use across the country.
Low entry costs and decentralized transmission design, the
6
prevailing ethos holds, foster disruptive “generativity.” Online companies

1. See Robbie Brown, A Swiveling Proxy That Will Even Wear a Tutu, N.Y. Times (June 7,
2013), http://mobile.nytimes.com/2013/06/08/education/for-homebound-students-a-robot-proxy-in-theclassroom.html; Noam Cohen, Red Hook’s Cutting-Edge Wireless Network, N.Y. Times (Aug. 22,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/24/nyregion/red-hooks-cutting-edge-wireless-network.html; Jared
Keller, Evaluating Iran’s Twitter Revolution, Atlantic (June 18, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2010/06/evaluating-irans-twitter-revolution/58337/; see also Lizzie Wade, Where
Cellular Networks Don’t Exist, People Are Building Their Own, Wired (Jan. 14, 2015, 6:30 AM),
http://www.wired.com/2015/01/diy-cellular-phone-networks-mexico/.
2. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2015); id. § 1302(a).
3. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2015).
4. Id. § 254(b)(3).
5. See, e.g., Barbara van Schewick, Internet Architecture and Innovation (2010); Tim Wu &
Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 Fed.
Comm. L.J. 575 (2007); see also Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 23 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 829 (2008); Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1345 (2004).
6. See Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet––And How to Stop It 80–90 (2008).
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like Amazon, Zipcar, Travelocity, and Uber were all once fledgling startups that, through the savvy and creativity of their developers, created
new value for customers in the retail product distribution, car rental,
travel agency, and taxi dispatch industries. To the extent there is
anything of the Communication Act’s commitment to equality in this
disruption, policymakers and legal scholars assume that the spillover
effects of innovation by talented and networked elites will eventually
7
spread to everyone else.
This trickle down theory has guided broadband policymaking for
8
the last decade. Even as policymakers and scholars disagree about how
best to promote innovation on the Internet, the ascendant ethos has
coalesced around “network neutrality,” an approach that would allow
users and innovators to engage the Internet freely and without
9
permission from their broadband providers. Broadband providers under
a regime of network neutrality would be barred from blocking or
10
discriminating between applications and content. This was the approach
the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) took when it adopted
11
its Open Internet Rules in February 2015. The White House and the
FCC have recited the trickle down mantra to justify the Rules as though
it is an iron law: Internet innovation, they argue, will generate user
interest which, in turn, will induce investment in Internet infrastructure
12
which in turn, will benefit everyone.

7. See Brett M. Frischmann, Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources 336 (2012);
see also Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14-28, Report and Order on
Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5657 ¶ 128 (Feb. 26, 2015) (“We do not
seek to disrupt the legitimate benefits that may accrue to edge providers that have invested in
enhancing the delivery of their services to end users. On the contrary, such investments may contribute
to the virtuous cycle by stimulating further competition and innovation among edge providers, to the
ultimate benefit of consumers.”).
8. See Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable
Facilities, CS Docket No. 02-52, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC
Rcd. 4798 (2002). Broadband is a regulatory term of art that the FCC has used for over the past
decade and a half to classify high-speed connections in the “last mile.” See id. The term “broadband” is
short hand for what Congress described in the Communications Act as “advanced telecommunications
capability.” 47 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1) (2013). In January, the FCC updated the broadband standard to 25
Mbps for downloads and 3 Mbps for uploads. See Press Release, FCC, FCC Finds U.S. Broadband
Deployment Not Keeping Pace 1 (Jan. 29, 2015) (on file with author).
9. Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and Quality of Service: What a Nondiscrimination
Rule Should Look Like, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2015); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband
Discrimination, 2 J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 141 (2003) (coining the term).
10. van Schewick, supra note 9, at 4; Wu, supra note 9, at 141.
11. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, supra note 7.
12. This phenomenon has been described as “the virtuous cycle of network innovation and
[infrastructure development].” See Exec. Office of the President, Community-Based Broadband
Solutions: The Benefits of Competition and Choice for Community Development and Highspeed
Internet Access 6 (2015). Net neutrality has its detractors, concerned that too heavy a regulatory
touch would undermine innovation. Providers, on this view, have an incentive to create new value for
subscribers in ways that a flat network neutrality rule would undermine. See Christopher S. Yoo,
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Emphasizing innovation over everything else is costly. First, as a
regulatory objective, Congress has determined that promoting innovation
13
is simply not as important as assuring substantive distributional equality.
At best, innovation is a third-order priority that barely makes an
14
appearance in the Communications Act.
Second, universal deployment of broadband is vital because the
15
Internet is today’s premier general use technology. Like electricity, the
Internet suffuses every aspect of our daily lives. The Internet has become
the platform through which people learn about and seek jobs, health
care, housing, and education. It defines the way in which currency flows
and investments are made. The Internet, moreover, has become an
essential feature of the way in which people play, meet life partners, and
share intimate thoughts. It plays an essential part of the way in which
political and social movements organize and spread. And beyond making
phones smart, the Internet today is also enabling our homes, appliances,
16
cars, clothing, and general accessories to be even “smarter.”
In short, it is the premier communications platform through which
public life today is shaped and is increasingly becoming the repository of
17
our individual and collective identity. To be excluded from all of its
affordances is either an act of defiance, ignorance, or the consequence of
material misfortune and disadvantage.
At best, the singular focus on innovation tenuously advances the
imperative to make reasonably comparable communications services
available to all Americans. Yet, the trickle down theory might even
undermine the very economic and social benefits that policymakers and
scholars purport will flow from network neutrality because its immediate
beneficiaries are the very elites who already benefit from relatively
superior service. Many Americans today have mediocre connections with
18
only limited functionality. Still others are relatively ignorant of or
indifferent to the full range of the Internet’s affordances and constitutive
19
applications. And a notable number of Americans are completely shut

Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 34 (2005). But even opponents share a commitment
to innovation over other policy goals.
13. See infra Part I.C.
14. See infra Part I.C.
15. Cf. Robert Plotkin, The Genie in the Machine: How Computer-Automated Inventing Is
Revolutionizing Law and Business 30 (2009) (referring to computers as “general-purpose
machines” or “universal machines”).
16. See generally Zittrain, supra note 6 (exploring the past, present, and future of the Internet).
17. See Jaron Lanier, You Are Not a Gadget 25 (2010) (discussing the “Singularity” idea).
18. See Philip M. Napoli & Jonathan A. Obar, The Emerging Mobile Internet Underclass: A
Critique of Mobile Internet Access, 30 Info. Soc’y J. 323, 326 (2014).
19. See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment
Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data
Improvement Act, GN Docket No. 11-121, Eighth Broadband Progress Report, 27 FCC Rcd. 10,342,
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out, with no serviceable connections in their local residential area.
Recent studies show that the “digital divide” remains a stubborn
problem, stimulating the familiar demographic fault lines of race,
ethnicity, and income that play a significant role in determining whether
21
a user has access to the Internet.
Race, ethnicity, and income do not just influence whether users
have access to the Internet. Those factors also affect how they use it,
which, in turn, fundamentally shape the nature of the online world. For
example, Blacks, Latinos, rural residents, and low income Americans are
more likely to access the Internet through a smartphone or other mobile
22
device than Whites. And while this development has helped to close the
availability and access gap, mobile devices have a narrower range of
functionality. Today, conventional mobile devices do not have many of
the capabilities as personal computers. Further, mobile devices are not as
immersive because they do not have the same range of storage or
23
processing capacity. Thus, users who can now go online because of
mobile technology still cannot do as much online as networked elites.
24
Mobile connections are not a substitute for fixed wired service.
These findings elaborate the pathbreaking findings that the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration published in the
25
1990s on broadband availability and adoption rates. That report is often
credited with coining the phrase “digital divide” and sensitizing
policymakers and journalists to the fact of disparity between the
26
“information haves and have nots.”
Race, ethnicity, and income continue to define availability, adoption,
and use patterns nearly two decades later. The trickle down theory
purports to redress these disparities, but does so through indirection: it
promises that infrastructure investment and deployment will be the

10,403–11 ¶¶ 139–56 (2012) [hereinafter Eighth Broadband Progress Report]; see also U.S. Census
Bureau, Measuring America: Computer and Internet Trends in America (2014).
20. Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at 10,369–70 ¶¶ 45–47.
21. See David Crow, Digital Divide Exacerbates US Inequality, Fin. Times (Oct. 28, 2014, 4:03
PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/b75d095a-5d76-11e4-9753-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3IIlsgT5A.
22. See Aaron Smith, Pew Research Ctr., Smartphones as an Internet Appliance (2011).
Specifically, thirty-eight percent of Black/Latino smartphone users rely on their smartphones while
only seventeen percent of non-Hispanic Whites do. Id. This distribution might reflect the role of
median income, since users with incomes of less than $30,000 were more than twice as likely as those
with incomes of $50,000 or more to do so. See Kathryn Zickuhr & Aaron Smith, Pew Research Ctr.,
Digital Differences (2012).
23. See Napoli & Obar, supra note 18, at 324; Eli Noam, Let Them Eat Cellphones: Why Mobile
Wireless Is No Solution for Broadband, 1 J. on Info. Pol’y 470, 480–81 (2011).
24. Cf. Susan P. Crawford, First Amendment Common Sense, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 2343, 235556 (2014).
25. See generally Nat’l Telecomm. & Info. Admin., Falling Through the Net: Defining the
Digital Divide (1999) (examining which American households have access to telephones, computers,
and the Internet, and which do not).
26. See id. at Executive Summary.
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fortuitous by-products of formal neutrality. But, unless policymakers
address disparity head-on, neutrality could just as likely worsen existing
inequalities in the short and long term because its first and most
immediate beneficiaries are networked elites. That is, even when networks
are “open,” actually existing structural patterns of disparity and difference
will remain and determine the ways through which users engage the
Internet. If these are not reversed, the relative advantage in access that
networked elites hold will reproduce itself over time until it eventually
becomes entrenched.
Surprisingly, an unintendedand unrecognizedbenefit of the
FCC’s network neutrality proceeding, as well as a series of other recent
regulatory interventions, is an opening to reclaim the core distributional
27
concerns of the Communications Act. The FCC has declared that the
Internet is a public general use technologylike electricityand,
accordingly, must be treated under law as a common carrier. Under this
rule, service providers must ensure that all members of the public who
28
try to access the Internet are treated equally. While the FCC’s vision of
equal treatment is predicated on formal neutrality, the Open Internet
Rules provide a legal foundation for a new commitment to substantive
equality.
This Article uses this potential new commitment to argue for a
return to the fundamental principle of equality over neutrality. Some
legal scholars already have done pioneering work on bias, discrimination,
and harassment in social networking and elsewhere online, and the law’s
29
potential role in stamping them out. It is time to turn this project for law
30
reform to broadband infrastructure and service. In this vein, the

27. It took strong public pushback to get to this opening. The pivot toward the focus on disparity
was chiefly inspired by the public’s record-breaking resistance to the FCC and its Chairman’s
intentions to use the neutrality rules to encourage “economic growth, investment, innovation, free
expression, and competition.” Oversight of the Federal Communications Commission: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Comm. and Tech. (2014) (statement of Tom Wheeler, Chairman, FCC). The gist of
the public’s reaction was not on the form or pace of innovation, but, rather, on the unadorned problem
of inequality. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, F.C.C. Is Deluged with Comments on Net Neutrality Rules, N.Y. Times
(July 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/technology/a-deluge-of-comment-on-net-rules.html;
Edward Wyatt, F.C.C. Begins Investigation into Quality of Internet Download Speeds, N.Y. Times
(June 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/14/business/media/FCC-inquiry-into-ties-betweencontent-companies-and-service-providers.html?_r=2.
28. See Press Release, FCC, FCC Adopts Strong, Sustainable Rules to Protect the Open Internet
(Feb. 26, 2015) (on file with author).
29. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 61 (2009); Jerry Kang,
Cyber-Race, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1130 (2000).
30. In an article that I published five years ago, I addressed the FCC’s failure to abide by
important public-regarding procedural norms (embodied in administrative law doctrine, for example)
in its implementation of broadband policy. See Olivier Sylvain, Internet Governance and Democratic
Legitimacy, 62 Fed. Comm. L.J. 205 (2010). There, I argued that the agency relied too uncritically on
engineering norms in order to promulgate its rules. Now, however, that the agency’s authority to
regulate broadband has been scrutinized by federal courts and its current plan for regulating the
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Article builds on research on the current “digital divide,” but especially
scholarship by Jerry Kang on the similitude and tension in the language
of nondiscrimination in debates concerning network neutrality and civil
31
rights. The Article argues that broadband disparity continues to have
consequences for how the poor and racial and ethnic minorities integrate
into a host of contexts.
In doing so, however, this Article makes two novel contributions to
existing scholarship. First, it attempts to excavate and revive communication
law’s core commitment to substantive distributional equality and identifies
it as a principle that should guide policy in this area. Second, it urges a
shift in regulatory and scholarly focus that better reflects distributional
concerns. It does so by identifying interventions for the future.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I analyzes the trickle down
theory of Internet innovation, arguing that innovation is not a core or
even second-order priority of the Communications Act. Deployment and
distributional equality, it shows, are the primary objectives of public law
in this area. Part II describes the current state of broadband service
generally and the distributional fault lines in availability, access, and use.
These raw facts underscore how misplaced the singular focus on
innovation has been. That the Internet is a general use technology
strongly suggests that access and use disparities will exacerbate racial,
ethnic, and income disparities elsewhere in public life. Part III describes
the network neutrality, as well as “Open Internet” proceeding that led
the FCC to promulgate the new rules. While the agency remains loyal to
the trickle down theory of innovation, this Article shows, the agency
acceded to the public’s demand for equality in broadband policy.
In Part IV, the Article lays out the positive argument for network
equality. First, it argues that the concept of substantive equality supplies
a productive framework for the regulation of broadband service in ways
that the prevailing focus on innovation and formal neutrality do not. It
shows, moreover, that recent federal policy holds untapped potential to
foster distributional equality of broadband resources, but the FCC has
not done enough. Formal neutrality in access to bandwidth is meaningless
without greater attention to inequality in the constitutive elements of the
network itself. This final Part concludes by summarizing some of the
limitations of the network equality framing.
I. The Trickle Down Theory of Internet Innovation
All communication technologies shape public life. The Internet is no
different. Like industrial book publishing, postal roads, telegraphy, and

provision of service has been subjected to public notice and comment, I turn to the substance of the
agency’s policies.
31. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Race.Net Neutrality, 6 J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 1 (2007).
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32

radio broadcasting in the past, the Internet has facilitated new forms of
33
expression and community.
The transmission design on which the Internet has been based for
almost four decades enables lay users to communicate almost anything
with others anywhere around the world. Thus, today, a user can draw on
the vast amounts of information coursing through the Internet to
navigate the physical world with little more than a laptop or smart phone.
A tourist can, for example, uncover transportation routes, discover the
best local eateries, find a restroom, and avoid risky situations, all while
video chatting with a friend miles away. But, of course, the Internet
affords so much more. A paraplegic patient who lives outside of
Dubuque can video chat with a kidney specialist in Chicago. A pop band
in Cape Town can collaborate with likeminded musicians in Paris.
Political activists can organize street protests in Cairo from anywhere
around the world. The possibilities seem endless.
Today’s raw physical political economy of Internet access––
broadband––sits in stark contrast to all of this dynamic possibility
because users in most local areas have the option of only one or two
34
providers. As gatekeepers in these areas, they have the incentive to
extract fees from casual users and sophisticated edge providers like
Netflix and Amazon. These fees cause little concern to those who can
afford the premium service; they continue to transmit and download
online services and applications as they wish. But those who cannot
afford the better service can only scratch the surface of the Internet’s rich
affordances.
Until recently, in the United States, local access providers’
pecuniary prerogatives generally determined lay users’ service quality.
They could offer tiered pricing schemes so that people who wanted or
35
simply could afford better service could pay for it. Access providers
could also enter into specialized arrangements with major Internet
companies and edge providers to quicken or otherwise privilege access to
subscribers. Lay users generally have had little choice in the matter. One
recent manifestation of this practice is “zero-rating,” where mobile
service providers do not count subscribers’ connections to affiliated
36
content or applications against data usage limits. Mobile providers
implement such plans to gain an obvious advantage over competitors.

32. See James W. Carey, Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society 155–77
(1992); Richard John, Network Nation (2010); see also Sylvain, supra note 30, at 265–67.
33. Cf. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (1983) (exploring role of capitalism and
printing, rise of nation-states, and use of language in the creation and growth of communities).
34. Susan P. Crawford, Captive Audience: The Telecom Industry and Monopoly Power in
the New Gilded Age 3, 120–22, 185–86 (2013).
35. van Schewick, supra note 9, at 127.
36. Id. at 30.
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There are reasons to believe that zero-rating might actually help spawn
37
Internet access in developing countries.
This past February, the FCC substantially circumscribed the extent
to which access providers could leverage their market position in this
way. The agency promulgated new Open Internet Rules that forbid
broadband providers from blocking or discriminating between different
kinds of Internet applications and content. Its animating reason for the
rules is to encourage innovation. The Commission employs the following
syllogism to justify this approach: unimpeded innovation by application
developers will generate more user interest which, in turn, will induce
access providers to invest in infrastructure which, in turn, will benefit
everyone, including the underserved. This is the trickle down theory of
Internet innovation. The new rules do this by requiring broadband
38
providers to be “neutral” in how they manage their users’ connections.
The FCC is not alone in its commitment to promoting innovation.
The concept has been the animating concern for the President and other
top-level federal policymakers, scholars, and stakeholders on all sides of
39
the network neutrality debate for well over a decade. The main
disagreement has been over which regulatory arrangement creates the
most value for consumers. But innovation is the driving concern for most.
The following passage from a January 2015 report by the President’s
National Economic Council and Council of Economic Advisers captures
the prevailing view:
Over the longer term, broadband adoption also fuels a virtuous cycle of
Internet innovation. This cycle begins when new applications of the
Internet create demand for more bandwidth, resulting in a wave of
network-level innovation and infrastructure investment. As more
bandwidth becomes available, application-sector innovators find new
ways to use that capacity, creating additional demand, leading to
another round of network investment, and so on. While it is impossible
to know what the next bandwidth-hungry killer application will be . . .
both history and economic theory show that this virtuous cycle is a
40
powerful driver of innovation and economic growth.

37. See Diana Carew, Zero-Rating: Kick-Starting Internet Ecosystems in Developing Countries,
Progressive Pol’y Inst. (Mar. 2015), http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/
2015.03-Carew_Zero-Rating_Kick-Starting-Internet-Ecosystems-in-Developing-Countries.pdf.
38. See discussion infra Part III.
39. See, e.g., van Schewick, supra note 5; Wu & Yoo, supra note 5; Net Neutrality, White House,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/net-neutrality#section-read-the-presidents-statement (Oct. 28, 2015); Tim
Wu, Why Have Telecommunications Law?: Anti-Discrimination Norms in Communications, 5 J. on
Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 15, 26 (2006) [hereinafter Wu, Why Have Telecommunications Law?];
Tom Wheeler, Chairman, FCC, Remarks at Silicon Flatirons Center, Boulder, Colorado (Feb. 9, 2015)
(transcript available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/chairman-wheeler-silicon-flatirons-center-bouldercolorado).
40. Exec. Office of the President, supra note 12.
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Policymakers did not originate this framing. They owe it almost
entirely to the most prominent information and Internet law scholars and
41
thought leaders of the past decade. The consensus view among
advocates and opponents of intervention is that, whatever regulatory
arrangement policymakers formulate, they should ensure that the Internet
42
remains an engine for innovation. Advocates generally argue that, in
order for the Internet to continue to thrive, application developers must
43
be able to “innovate without permission.” Opponents, on the other
hand, assert that the price mechanism in the market is the best way to
allocate costs and risks, and that service providers should be given the
freedom to develop affiliations with content and application developers
44
to create new value for subscribers.
In any event, both sides of the debate presume that, whatever
regulatory choice the agency makes, innovation fosters a wide range of
incidental or spillover economic and social benefits that accrue to society
as a result. This Part outlines the contours of the debate.
A. Network Neutrality as Innovation Policy
Neutrality advocates argue that service providers should not be able
to ration the quality of users’ broadband connections to further their own
pecuniary interests. The staunchest advocates accordingly oppose any
proposal that would allow providers to charge a premium to prioritize
some Internet connections over others. They argue that most users and
application start-ups would not be able to afford the specialized
treatment, and that this asymmetry would work to the detriment of
invention and innovation on the Internet generally. After all, these
advocates point out, online giants like Google and Netflix were once
start-ups, too, and only succeeded because they did not have to pay a
45
premium to reach users.
Many of these advocates accordingly argue for a flat-out ban on
application and content discrimination. They argue that all Internet
users, large or small, should be able to access the applications, content,
services, and networked devices of their choice. Access providers, they
argue, should not block or otherwise interfere with users’ ability to share
41. See, e.g., van Schewick, supra note 5; Wu & Yoo, supra note 5; see also von Lohmann, supra
note 5; Lemley & Reese, supra note 5.
42. See, e.g., Wu, Why Have Telecommunications Law?, supra note 39, at 26.
43. See van Schewick, supra note 9, at 24–27 n.76.
44. See, e.g., Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: An
Institutional Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate, 7 J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 19, 24–26
(2009); Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The
Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1822, 1848–49 (2007); Yoo, supra note 12, at 34.
45. See Tim Wu, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires 284 (2010)
(discussing the rise of Google and the threat that it and other edge providers face from broadband
providers).
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ideas and content freely; developers should not have to worry about
46
contracting with providers in order to reach users. Instead, they argue,
providers should be forbidden from discriminating against different
applications or content. Providers should simply just use their best efforts
47
to deliver data to their intended destination irrespective of application.
Such a rule, they assert, would ensure that the Internet continues to be
the dynamic platform for innovation it has been for the past two to three
48
decades. Paid prioritization, on the other hand, would only encourage
providers to supply high-quality service to those who are willing to pay.
“Strong open Internet rules,” they argue, “are necessary to preserve the
virtual cycle of innovation and investment and ensure that the Internet
remains a robust platform for consumer choice, economic growth and
49
free speech.”
Neutrality advocates, moreover, point to providers’ demonstrable
interest in controlling user access to competitor services and applications.
For example, Comcast, the most notorious of access providers among
neutrality advocates, sought approval from federal regulators of its
50
proposed merger with Time Warner, another dominant access provider.
The merger would have reached about a third of U.S. homes, far more
51
than any of their competitors. The companies expected that, by joining
forces, they would meet increasing demand for better Internet-based
services and create new value for their subscribers. Neutrality advocates
feared that the new combination would exert unprecedented control over
52
Internet connections. After all, both companies have employed network
management practices that leverage their strong market position at the
53
expense of start-up edge providers. They have also degraded
connections to rival video and voice applications, ostensibly to protect

46. Letter from Michael Beckerman, President & CEO, The Internet Ass’n, to Marlene H.
Dortch, Sec’y, FCC (Jan. 6, 2015) (on file with FCC); see also Susan P. Crawford, Transporting
Communications, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 871, 887 (2009); Wu, supra note 9, at 150.
47. See Brett M. Frischmann, Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources 348–55
(2012); Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, 55 UCLA L. Rev.
359, 403–04 (2007).
48. Wu, Why Have Telecommunications Law?, supra note 39, at 26; Wu, supra note 9, at 150. For
advocates of this strong neutrality rule, access providers would only be excused from such obligations
in the event of a targeted attack, virus, or other demonstrable threat to the operation of the local
network.
49. See, e.g., Letter from Michael Beckerman, supra note 46, at 1.
50. Cade Metz, Why the Comcast-Time Warner Deal Is Far More Dangerous than You Think,
Wired (Feb. 13, 2014, 4:25 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/02/comcasts-45bn-time-warner-buychange-everything/; Sanjay Sanghoee, Why the Feds Should Block Comcast’s Merger with Time
Warner Cable, Fortune (Apr. 22, 2014, 2:27 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/04/22/why-the-feds-shouldblock-comcasts-merger-with-time-warner-cable/.
51. Metz, supra note 50; Sanghoee, supra note 50.
52. Sanghoee, supra note 50.
53. Metz, supra note 50.
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their own affiliated applications or services from the competition. Partly
in response to strong public resistance to the merger, the FCC signaled
55
its wariness about the deal. Seeing the writing on the wall, Comcast and
Time Warner withdrew the plan.
Generally, neutrality advocates endorse a general rule against data
discrimination, but would accommodate network management practices
that assure “quality of service” for real-time or latency-sensitive audio or
video applicationsthat is, accommodations for applications that require
data to be sent in a particular way in order for the applications with
56
which they are associated to function as they should. Such an exception
recognizes that being completely agnostic about the applications or bits
of data that flow through the network would diminish the quality of some
of the most popular video streaming applications. A rule of perfect
neutrality that makes no exceptions for latency-sensitive applications,
these advocates argue, would actually be biased in favor of applications
like e-mail or even web browsers that are not as latency sensitive.
Opponents of network neutrality argue that access providers pose
no real harm to the vast majority of Internet users. For them, the
question should not be whether broadband providers’ networks must be
open but rather how policy can help providers create the most value for
consumers. They argue that, instead, policymakers should take lessons
57
from competition law. The antitrust laws after all protect consumers
58
and small companies from the predations of dominant incumbents.
Thus, regulators should focus instead on whether access providers
59
actually have market power or engage in unfair trade practices. If they
54. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Madison River Communications,
LLC, File No. EB-05-IH-0110, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295 (Enf’t Bureau 2005) (order adopting consent
decree); see also Press Release, supra note 28.
55. Devika Krishna Kumar, Comcast Drops Time Warner Cable Bid After Antitrust Pressure, Reuters
(Apr. 24, 2015, 6:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-comcast-timewarnercable-idUSKBN0N
E2D220150424.
56. See Wu, supra note 9, at 165. “Latency is a measure of the time it takes for a packet of data to
travel from one point to another in a network and often is measured by round-trip in milliseconds.”
Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at 10,362 ¶ 23.
57. There has been hearty debate among scholars about how to administer network management
regulations. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 529,
569 (2009) (arguing a self-regulatory body subject to public agency oversight as best strategy for
Internet regulation); Sylvain, supra note 30 (arguing for a participatory governance approach to
Internet policymaking).
58. See John B. Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers
from Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2425, 2433 (2013) (arguing that consumer welfare
is the priority in antitrust law based on legislative history, case law, popular opinion, and ease of
administration); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 Fordham L.
Rev. 2471, 2474 (2013); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust:
Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 191, 211–36 (2008).
59. See generally Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to
the Network Economy (1998) (applying traditional economic theories to modern information-based
technologies).
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do not, advocates of this perspective argue, access providers should be
able to affiliate or negotiate connection terms with edge providers like
60
Netflix or Google on an individualized basis. Regulators could assess
the validity of such arrangements on a case-by-case basis. Such an
approach, critics of the Open Internet Rules argue, would increase value
for consumers and invite innovations that only special vertical and
61
horizontal arrangements can create. In any event, they note that price is
an essential signal of consumers’ willingness to pay. Tiered pay-forpriority schemes like these allow providers to earn a return on their
investment while also allowing consumers to express their respective service
preferences.
Other opponents express support for some network neutrality
regulation of service providers, but strongly resist rendering broadband
service “a utility” for fear that it would inhibit or delay investment and
innovation in nascent applications and services. For example, these
opponents hold, such approach could stall improvements in new mobile
health products and services like remote monitoring of patients and
62
mobile-connected pill bottles. Thus, while this group’s opposition to
network neutrality is more narrowly tailored to defining the service as “a
utility” (akin to electricity), it is nevertheless similarly grounded in support
for innovation.
B. What the Innovation Fixation Misses
The debate among policymakers and scholars about how to allocate
duties and costs in furtherance of innovation in the market for
broadband service has framed federal policymakers’ decisionmaking in
the area for the past decade or so. But the preoccupation with innovation
in information law and public policy has been in vogue for much longer,
influencing technology company managers, scholars, and policymakers
63
inside and outside of communications.

60. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 659–61 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Silberman, J., dissenting).
61. Framework for Broadband Internet Service, Open Internet Rulemaking, GN Docket Nos. 10127, 14-28, Comments of Verizon and Verizon Wireless (July 15, 2014); see also Ev Ehrlich, Net
Neutrality Sounds Good, but It’s Worse, SFGate (July 24, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/
openforum/article/Net-neutrality-sounds-good-but-it-s-worse-5645596.php; Ariel Rabkin, The Internet Isn’t
Plumbed Like the Water System, Tech. Pol’y Daily (July 16, 2014), http://www.techpolicydaily.com/
communications/internet-isnt-plumbed-like-water-system/.
62. See Letter from Joel White, Exec. Dir., Health IT Now Coal., Bradley Merrill Thompson,
Gen. Counsel, M-Health Regulatory Coal., Robert B. McCray, President & CEO, Wireless-Life Scis.
All., to Tom Wheeler, Chairman Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, et al. (Jan. 15, 2015) (on file with FCC).
63. I do not seek here to answer the important question of how innovation has prevailed on
policymakers at the expense of other important regulatory priorities. It is enough here to observe,
simply, that innovation is in vogue. See generally Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s
Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Films to Fail (1997) (addressing significance of
corporate response to innovation in technology and change in market); see also Jill Lepore, The
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Consider the influence of Moore’s Law, a concept original to
64
information and computer science. In 1965, Gordon Moore, who was
then the leading researcher for a major semiconductor developer in
Silicon Valley, predicted that microchip processing capacity would
65
increase by “roughly a factor of two per year.” That is, improvements in
computing capacity would occur at a predictable exponential rate over
time. That claim has not been perfectly realized because, in fact,
66
advances in the area come in fits and starts. Nevertheless, the gist of the
67
claim has been influential. Moore’s prediction has proven persuasive
enough that top researchers and technology company managers now
68
count on it like a law of physics. Manufacturers were integrating it into
their industrial design practices within a decade of its announcement.
The largest semiconductor makers today continue to rely on it to
measure the pace of their manufacturing and marketing efforts,
irrespective of whether in fact it accurately describes the pace of their
native development processes.
As influential as it is, however, Moore’s Law is also very limited in
scope; it does not explain (or purport to explain) the manner in which
processing capacity is distributed among lay consumers. In fact, while
contemporary developers are the likeliest to benefit from each
incremental improvement in computing capacity, most consumers do not
bear witness to each of the advances. In this regard, Moore’s Law does
not offer an account of how different segments of the population actually
receive or benefit from improvements in processing capacity. Moreover,
the rate of improvement in computing capacity varies by device and most
users do not have access to anything but mass produced devices.
Communications and management scholars have recognized as much,
having developed taxonomies of adoption that explain how new
technologies disseminate through society over timefrom beta release
69
to popular adoption to obsolescence.
These actual distributional factors are precisely what the
preoccupation with innovation misses. This is not to say that policymakers
Disruption Machine: What the Gospel of Innovation Gets Wrong, New Yorker (June 23, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2014/06/23/140623fa_fact_lepore?currentPage=all.
64. See Bob Schaller, The Origin, Nature, and Implications of “Moore’s Law” (1996).
65. Id. at 7.
66. See, e.g., John Markoff, IBM Discloses Working Version of a Much Higher-Capacity Chip,
N.Y. Times (July 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/technology/ibm-announces-computerchips-more-powerful-than-any-in-existence.html?_r=0.
67. To understand the force of the claim, note that the theory of natural selection in evolutionary
biology does not purport to predict the rate at which prevalent observable human characteristics
change.
68. Cornelis Disco, Getting New Technologies Together 206–07 (1998); see also Schaller,
supra note 64.
69. See generally George M. Beal & Joe M. Bohlen, The Diffusion Process (1981) (discussing
how farmers accept new tools and ideas).
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and scholars have not addressed distributional concerns when they
discuss innovation. They have. But their focus has been narrow. At least
in the Open Internet Rules, the FCC has sought to allocate duties and
entitlements that balance the interests of a very narrow range of
networked elites, including, for example, start-up application developers,
prominent edge providers, local access providers, and major television
and film production studios. The average lay users are secondary. The
underservedthe people for whom Congress arguably enacted the
Communications Actare overlooked.
C. Innovation Is a Third-Order Public Law Priority
In its new rules, the FCC generally seeks to facilitate innovation by
requiring local access providers to treat data neutrallythat is, to refrain
from discriminating or blocking Internet connections based on the data
they contain or the edge providers and users from which they originate.
But these rules do not concern themselves directly with the distributional
question of whether or how lay users receive and use those connections.
And to the extent that the rules do, they do so only through indirection.
That is, policymakers assume that innovation (by the narrow band of
developers mentioned above) will trickle down to lay users, irrespective
of how its outputs get distributed among them.
But Congress made universal service deployment the primary
concern of the Communications Act. The statute has many other,
second-order objectives addressed to the telecommunications and
70
information services industries, including infrastructure investment,
71
72
73
competition and interconnection, privacy, law enforcement, and
74
national security. The amended statute, however, is unequivocal about
its central purpose. Its first paragraph provides that the FCC is
to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United
States, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide
wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at
75
reasonable charges.

Congress added the absolutist language in this provision (in essence,
“without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national

70. See 47 U.S.C. § 1302 (2015); see also id. § 157.
71. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 202 (2015); id. §§ 251, 252.
72. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510–2522 (West 2015).
73. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1001–1021 (1994).
74. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
75. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996). Before 1996, the provision simply provided that the FCC was
responsible for “regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as
to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient,
nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio communication service.” Id.
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origin, or sex”) in 1996 to ensure “nondiscrimination.” This concept was
far different from the pro-competitive sense of “nondiscrimination” as it
has appeared in the network neutrality debate. Where the latter is
addressed to applications or services, in 1996, Congress sought to make
plain that the FCC’s central purpose is to protect users and people from
discrimination irrespective of their station in life. Congress reiterated this
77
point in Section 706 of the 1996 amendments. In this way, the Act,
including and especially the 1996 amendments, bespeaks Congress’
unequivocal commitment to ensuring that communication technology is
widely available to all users irrespective of who or where they are. And
78
further that such service be “reasonably comparable.”
Congress has been consistent about this statutory objective across
media platforms. For example, again, in the 1996 amendments, Congress
announced a “national policy of diversity of media voices” in recognition
that too few broadcast stations and producers were owned or operated
79
by racial minorities or women. The FCC subsequently relied on this
1996 amendment to propose a rule that would explicitly forbid
discrimination on the basis of such characteristics. It sought to eliminate
longstanding patterns of exclusion in order to diversify programming
over the airwaves in a way that better reflected the variety of tastes of
U.S. consumers.
Congress, on the other hand, has not made innovation even a
secondary regulatory priority in the Communications Act. It invokes the
80
concept in the statute only rarely. In the few instances in which
Congress does use some cognate of the term in the Act, it is just one of a
variety of factors that the FCC must consider before making a specific
regulatory decision. Congress, for example, invokes the term in connection
with the FCC’s authority to determine whether a telecommunications
81
access provider has complied with rate requirements. In this context,
innovation is just one of a handful of factors that the agency must
consider. The only other place in which Congress chose to use the word
“innovate” or “innovative” in the Act is in reference to the general
82
policy priorities of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. There,

76. H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 32 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
77. See 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1996) (“The Commission and each State commission with regulatory
jurisdiction over telecommunications services shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable and
timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans.”).
78. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 18.
79. See 47 U.S.C. § 257(a), (c) (1996).
80. The word “innovation” appears just two times in the Communications Act, “innovative”
appears just once, and “innovate” is absent entirely.
81. 47 U.S.C. § 226(h)(3) (2015) (discussing the breadth of service offerings, service quality, and price).
82. See 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (2015).
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innovation must be weighed against program “quality, diversity,
83
creativity, [and] excellence.”
But the statute’s relative indifference to innovation has evidently
not been an impediment for those debating the substantive merits of
network neutrality. Purely as a matter of constitutional and administrative
law doctrine, however, the text of the statute must constrain the scope of
the agency’s authority to promulgate rules in the area. The FCC
accordingly has hewed to some stated authority in the Act in order to
announce the new rules, all while remaining loyal to its real interest in
innovation. Specifically, the FCC has turned to provisions that encourage
84
universal deployment of broadband. Its argument proceeds as follows:
openness and nondiscrimination encourage users and developers to
create new applications and content; the more varied Internet
applications are, the more likely that users will adopt broadband service;
the more new users, the more likely that providers will invest in their
networks and reach even more new users. For the agency and other
proponents of the trickle down orthodoxy, universal deployment is
innovation’s happy by-product.
In fact, however, the FCC’s real interest in innovation is orthogonal
to the statute’s core distributional concern. The rules, after all, will
remain fully applicable well after everyone is well connected, precisely
85
because universality is not their statutory objective. This is not to say
that a perfectly open national system of broadband might not encourage
universal employment. Nor is this to say that the Open Internet Rules
are illegitimate to the extent they promote innovation or encourage
entrepreneurship and competition. The D.C. Circuit rightfully held that
infrastructure investment is a reasonable objective of the rules under
86
Title I of the Communications Act. The point I make here is that, under
the statute, innovation is at best a third-order priority under the
Communications Act. As it relates to broadband in particular, Congress
actually expressed near indifference about how the FCC should regulate
broadbandwhether through a system of openness or something else.
Instead, the statute authorizes the agency to regulate or simply refrain
from regulating broadband, as long as, whatever action the agency
chooses “encourage[s]” broadband service “deployment on a reasonable
87
and timely basis.”
83. 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(2)(C) (2015).
84. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 643–45 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also Eighth Broadband Progress
Report, supra note 19, at 10,385 ¶ 92; Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices,
GN Docket No. 09-191, Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 17,905 ¶ 1 (2010).
85. The agency anticipates universal broadband adoption by 2022. See Eighth Broadband
Progress Report, supra note 19, at 10,344–45 ¶ 3.
86. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 642.
87. The statute provides in pertinent part that in order to “encourage the deployment on a
reasonable and timely basis” of broadband service, the FCC has the discretion to choose between
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Universal deployment is not a matter that should be so easily
contorted to advance other objectives. The Communications Act asserts
that the FCC’s core reason for being is to protect against distributional
unfairness in the delivery of emergent communications services. To
acknowledge as much would focus attention to whether broadband in the
United States is available “to all Americans.”
The answer to that inquiry is not a happy one. At least, it is
complicated. As I show below in Part II, the Internet ecosystem today is
defined by disparity and difference. There, I outline what the state of
broadband service actually is in the United States, irrespective of how
rapid the benefits of openness will flow to innovators and other
networked elites.
II. The Reality of Network Disparity
Since the establishment of the United States Postal Service in the
late eighteenth century, universal deployment of communications
infrastructure has long been a core public law priority in the United
States. But the statutory injunction in the Communications Act to assure
universal deployment of communication technologies is especially
pertinent at a time when networked communications have become essential
to the operation of public life. This is why the FCC and other commentators
have rightfully called the Internet the “general use” technology of our
88
time.
In fact, however, we are far short of universal deployment today.
Current patterns in broadband delivery across the country suggest
something more like “information redlining” in which providers fail to
build and service racial and ethnic minorities or lower income and rural
89
communities on the same terms as wealthier communities.
This Part briefly chronicles the manner in which broadband service
is unevenly distributed. Exhaustive research by the U.S. Census Bureau,
the Pew Research Center, and others shows definitively that, first,
disparities in broadband availability, adoption, and use have a substantial
impact on the manner in which different users engage the Internet and,
second, that these disparities track existing racial, ethnic, and class fault

“price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure
investment.” 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1996).
88. Cf. Plotkin, supra note 15, at 30 (referring to computers as “general-purpose machines” or
“universal machines”).
89. 140 Cong. Rec. 14844 (daily ed. June 28, 1994) (statement of Sen. Markey); see also John
Eggerton, MMTC Tells Government There Is Need for More than Speed, Broadcasting & Cable (Jan.
15, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/mmtc-tells-government-thereneed-more-speed/137119.
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90

lines. If the Internet is the premier general use technology of our time,
exclusion has substantial costs for the underserved and society at large.
These findings are alarming because they run against the clear statutory
objectives of communications law.
A. The Promise of an Open Internet
To understand the scope of what is at stake, it is worth noting how
embedded the Internet is in public life today. It inhabits practically all
aspects. Its most familiar applicationsthe World Wide Web and
e-mailenable people to communicate with landlords, political allies,
doctors, and lovers. Other applications provide important information to
consumers about products and services, including comparative price
information about health care options, cars, and homes. They enable
house hunters to find a place to live, homemakers to survey design ideas
for their home, job seekers to communicate with prospective employers,
and drivers to navigate backcountry roads.
The Internet today is also a vital component of our political culture.
Partisans, activists, and casual users alike rely on social media and an
array of Internet applications to mobilize people around issues and
electoral campaigns. Some of these efforts seek to spread awareness
about intractable sociopolitical and economic problems. Others are far
91
more whimsical.
Ordinary people are not the only beneficiaries of the Internet’s
affordances. The networked communication technologies of today have
become a terrific source of data about consumers and their habits. This,
in turn, has enabled “data brokers” and social networking administrators
92
to analyze and predict user behavior and preference. These advances
93
have created new markets in search, reputation, and finance. While
many of these changes challenge conventions in national security,
privacy, and consumer protection, firms continue to collect and share
online data with third-party brokers quite freely. Online user data has
become one of the driving currencies of the networked information

90. See, e.g., U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 19; Aaron Smith, Why Pew Internet Does Not
Regularly Report Statistics for Asian-Americans and Their Technology Use, Pew Research Ctr. (Mar.
29, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/03/29/why-pew-internet-does-not-regularly-report-statisticsfor-asian-americans-and-their-technology-use/.
91. Jason Wells, Cancer Patient’s Pre-Surgery Flash Mob Dance Goes Viral, Inspires, L.A. Times
(Nov. 8, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/nov/08/local/la-me-ln-cancer-patient-viral-video-flashmob-dance-20131108.
92. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1701, 1760 (2010).
93. Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money
and Information (2015).

I - Sylvain_17 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete)

February 2016]

NETWORK EQUALITY

2/9/2016 1:42 PM

463

94

economy. And, users have been complicit, volunteering their information
for fear of being left out.
These are just the conventional affordances of the Internet. Today,
95
all manners of devices and appliances are connected. Brick-and-mortar
retailers, homebuilders, automobile manufacturers, and consumer
appliance developers have over the past decade integrated networked
communications technology into their products. Cars and homes are now
equipped with remotely operated security and lighting systems. Clothes
now share and collect location and biometric data about their wearers
96
and the people immediately around them. And all of these connections
and transactions occur seamlessly, practically in real time, giving
consumers the sense that, no matter where they are, they are always
97
connected to the networked world. This is what observers mean when
98
they speak of the “Internet of Things.”
While much of this sounds like futurism, it is a core preoccupation
of network communication technology firms today. Eric Schmidt, the
Chairman of online search and advertising giant Google, recently
forecasted that “the Internet will disappear” because “it will be part of
99
your presence all the time.” Appliances, devices, and clothes, he
predicts, will interact with the rooms we walk into and the people we
100
meet, with our permission but mostly out of sight. This “post-Internet”
world will depend increasingly on algorithms and other automated
101
systems that will interact with each other on our behalf. The most
dramatic, quasi-religious version of this portrayal envisions The Transhuman
94. See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller & Somini Sengupta, Selling Secrets of Phone Users to Advertisers,
N.Y. Times (Oct. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/technology/selling-secrets-of-phoneusers-to-advertisers.html?pagewanted=all (discussing how companies like Google and Facebook are
trying to find new ways to monetize their user bases by finding way to target them with specific ads);
Danny Yadron, FTC Says Brokers Bid Private Data, Wall St. J. (May 7, 2013 6:22 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323687604578469392421956334.
95. See Pew Research Ctr., Digital Life in 2025 (2014).
96. Mat Honan, The Future of Wearables Isn’t a Connected Watch, Wired (Jan. 29, 2015, 5:00
AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/01/useful-wearables/.
97. See Christopher Steiner, Automate This: How Algorithms Came to Rule Our World 112
(2012).
98. See, e.g., Jeremy Rifkin, The Zero Marginal Cost Society: The Internet of Things, the
Collaborative Commons, and the Eclipse of Capitalism (2014); R.S. Raji, Smart Networks for
Control, 31 Spectrum, IEEE 49 (1994).
99. Michael Moore, Google Chairman Expects Internet to ‘Disappear’ Soon, TechWeek Europe
(Jan. 23, 2015, 12:06 PM), http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/e-innovation/eric-schmidt-google-internetdisappear-160126.
100. Id.
101. Cf. Ian Wallace, What Is Post-Internet Art? Understanding the Revolutionary New Art Movement,
Artspace (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.artspace.com/magazine/interviews_features/post_internet_art
(“[P]ost-Internet artists have moved beyond making work dependent on the novelty of the Web to
using its tools to tackle other subjects. And while earlier Net artists often made works that existed
exclusively online, the post-Internet generation (many of whom have been plugged into the Web since
they could walk) frequently uses digital strategies to create objects that exist in the real world.”).
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Singularity, in which all information is shared freely for the betterment of
102
humanity.
The Internet in this vein has become the general repository of our
individual and shared identities. Information about us online reflects who
we are individually and collectively. If you are not online, you might as
well be invisible. The benefits of online participation greatly outweigh its
costs. Full network integration is now imperative, and exclusion,
potentially disastrous.
B. Internet Access Today as It Exists in Fact
The Internet’s indispensability is not lost on most Americans.
According to the Census Bureau’s 2013 data, about 74% of American
103
households use the Internet, up from 18% in 1997. But its demonstrable
growth masks the manner and rate at which lay users are connecting. To
say that people are using the Internet more than they ever have does not
say much about the character of their uses, or the purposes to which they
are putting their connections.
In fact, many people do not have all of the affordances of the
Internet at their fingertips. We know that users and application
developers alike, no matter how savvy they might be, are only as
innovative and sociable online as their physical points of contact with the
Internet allow them to be. And for many users, bad or unreliable service
is a feature of their service rather than a bug. The disparities between
those with great service and those with typically poor or mediocre
connections manifest themselves in a variety of complicated ways, but
generally correlate with race, ethnicity, and class. In other words, we are
very far from being “post-Internet” today.
Yet, most users just assume that high-speed Internet service is
always available. In fact, however, it is neither speedy nor reliable for
everyone. Only the most well-to-do have access to the best broadband
service. That is, a relatively small fraction of Americans have platinum
broadband service, a majority have limited but good enough service to
engage a variety of high bandwidth applications like Netflix and other
services simultaneously, and a small but notable fraction have poor or no
104
service at all. This breakdown is largely defined by a variety of
demographic factors that affect users’ willingness or ability to adopt
service. In this regard, it is not unlike the market for goods and services
in all of public life. From big-ticket necessities like healthcare and
housing to more leisurely pursuits like air travel and fine dining, public
102. See Lanier, supra note 17, at 25–26.
103. Thom File & Camille Ryan, U.S. Census Bureau, Computer and Internet Use in the
United States: 2013, at 2, 3 (2014).
104. Pew Research Ctr., Broadband Technology Fact Sheet (2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/
fact-sheets/broadband-technology-fact-sheet/.
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life in the United States is characterized by an unequal distribution of
goods and servicesa social arrangement in which the proverbial one
percent can afford the best, a majority can afford passable goods and
105
services, and a meaningful minority have little to nothing at all.
In this regard, broadband service disparities are not random; they
track the very same demographic fault lines of race, ethnicity, and class
that define public life generally in the United States. Here, in this
Subpart, I catalogue some of the ways in which these disparities manifest
themselves nationally. To be clear, broadband service data is generally
difficult to synthesize. Some reports, for example, rely on obsolete or
106
inapposite speed benchmarks. Others do not disaggregate between
fixed and mobile broadband connections, let alone different kinds of
107
fixed service, such as DSL, cable, and fiber. Still others do not
distinguish between service availability like the sheer existence of service
that passes by the home and adoption, in essence, the choice to open a
subscription. Nevertheless there is sufficient available data to make
modest and incontrovertible observations about broadband service
disparity today.
1.

Access and Adoption
108

Availability rates correlate significantly with locality. The FCC
reported in 2012 that nineteen million Americans, six percent of the
population, did not have fixed broadband service available to them in
109
their local area. Three-quarters of this group lives in rural areas where
population density is very low. One reason for this disparity is that the
“business case” for building and administering service to remote and
sparsely populated areas is difficult to make. Without government
subsidies, the building and administration of new networks is prohibitively
110
expensive.

105. See generally Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Arthur Goldhammer,
trans. 2014). This state of affairs is hardly something with which most people are comfortable. And,
yet, disparities remain and, now, appear to have become one of the defining features of American life.
106. See, e.g., Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at 10,364, 10,386–87 ¶¶ 29, 97
(referring to 3 Mbps/768 kbps benchmark rather than current regulatory standard of 4 Mbps/1 Mbps);
Press Release, FCC, Connecting America: The National Broadband Plan 6 (Mar. 17, 2010) (on file
with author) (recognizing dissonance between available data reported by providers and new
benchmark).
107. See, e.g., Pew Research Ctr., supra note 104.
108. Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at 10,379 ¶ 80; see also Olivier Sylvain,
Broadband Localism, 73 Ohio St. L.J. 795 (2012).
109. Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at 10,359–58 ¶¶ 4547. Cable and DSL
providers account for the largest portion of the service. Id. at 10,374 ¶ 60.
110. Id. at 10,369–86 ¶¶ 4493.
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Meanwhile, the rate of adoption in the United States is around
111
seventy percent today. This is a substantial increase from 2000. The
main barriers to user adoption are different from that for broadband
deployment. Today’s user adoption barriers include service cost, the lack
of digital literacy, and the perceptions about the Internet’s lack of
112
relevance.
To put a finer point on it, about one in four American households
113
with access do not use the Internet. About a quarter of that population
reports that the monthly cost of broadband service is too expensive to
114
justify. Here, income is significantly correlated with the rate at which
115
households actually adopt service when it is available in their area.
Many in this group, moreover, tend to be older, make less than $30,000
116
per year, and have less than a high school education. In short, income is
117
among the strongest determining variables of Internet access and use.
Residence or geography, too, is a major factor, with states in the
Deep South showing the lowest rates in the country of households that
118
are connected to broadband. This geographic trend further supports
data showing that median household income is an important driver of
119
broadband adoption rates.
Nearly half of the people in households who choose not to subscribe
but otherwise have access to broadband report that they simply do not
120
want it. The most commonly given reason for why members of this
group do not subscribe to broadband (or even dial-up) is the perception
121
that the Internet is not relevant or useful to their lives. For example,
many in this group find the Internet sufficiently irrelevant such that they

111. See Pew Research Ctr., supra note 104; Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at
10,394 ¶ 120 (stating the FCC reported that about two-thirds of American households had adopted the
service by 2012); see also FCC, Internet Access Services: Status as of December 31, 2013, at 11–13
(2014).
112. Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at 10,403–11 ¶¶ 13956.
113. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 19.
114. Id.
115. See Mark Dutz et al., The Substantial Consumer Benefits of Broadband Connectivity for U.S.
Households, Internet Innovation Reliance 28 (July 2009) (“In 2008, 88% of high-income households
(with annual household income exceeding $100,000) [subscribed] to broadband, while only 41% of
low-income households (with annual income less than $25,000) had adopted it.”); Smith, supra note 22,
at 10 (finding, in 2010, that one-third of broadband users subscribed to a “premium” Internet access
service, paying a little over forty-one dollars per month on average for it).
116. Smith, supra note 22, at 10; see also Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at
10,378 ¶ 75.
117. See Council of Economic Advisers, Mapping the Digital Divide (2015).
118. File & Ryan, supra note 103.
119. See Andrea Peterson, Why the South Lags Behind When It Comes to Home Broadband Use,
Wash. Post (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/11/17/why-thesouth-lags-behind-when-it-comes-to-home-broadband-use/.
120. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 19.
121. Id.; see also Zickuhr & Smith, supra note 22.
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122

opt to not own a computer. And, yet, about twenty-one percent of nonadopters admit to their lack of sophistication or literacy about the online
123
world.
2.

Race and Ethnicity

Race and ethnicity also bear on availability and adoption rates.
Tribal communities, for example, are more likely than others to lack
124
service. This, however, is largely because any group, irrespective of
125
race or ethnicity, is less likely to have access in rural areas. Most racial
and ethnic minorities, on the other hand, live in and around urban areas
where population density is characteristically very high and broadband is
likely to be available. But, while access has increased dramatically across
demographic groups in just the past five years, racial disparities in
Internet access, adoption, and use persist even in cities. As of 2013, about
sixty-five percent of Hispanic households and sixty percent of non126
Hispanic Black households have broadband at home. Compare this to
the seventy-six percent of non-Hispanic White households with such
127
connections. Observers generally attribute the low adoption rate of
Hispanic and non-Hispanic Black households to the prohibitively high
128
cost of service or equipment.
A recent Field Poll in California also found that adoption rates
among Latinos are starkly lower than those for other demographic
groups. While seventy-five percent of all adults in California have
broadband service at home, that rate is thirty-two percent for those who

122. Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at 10,409 ¶ 152.
123. Zickuhr & Smith, supra note 22; see also John B. Horrigan, Digital Readiness: Nearly
One-Third of Americans Lack the Skills to Use Next-Generation “Internet of Things” Applications
(2014), http://jbhorrigan.weebly.com/uploads/3/0/8/0/30809311/digital_readiness.horrigan.june2014.pdf.
See generally The Complexity of “Relevance” as a Barrier to Broadband Adoption, Benton Found.
(Jan. 6, 2016 3:55 PM), https://www.benton.org/blog/complexity-relevance-barrier-broadband-adoption?
utm_campaign=Newsletters&utm_source=sendgrid&utm_medium=email (“[S]uccessful interventions
will need to unpack the relevance concept and address “ability to pay” instead of ‘willingness to pay’
for broadband at home. Further research, including additional questions on nationwide broadband
adoption surveys, is also needed to establish a more in-depth understanding of relevance as an issue,
particularly for individuals and families in low-income communities where cost remains the most
significant barrier to adoption.”).
124. See Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at 10,378 ¶ 73.
125. Id.
126. See Smith, supra note 90 (noting that Pew does not collect data on broadband adoption and use
by Asian Americans largely because Asian Americans constitute “a very small slice of the population,
3.7 percent in the 2000 Census”).
127. Id.
128. See Danielle Keh et al., The Cost of Connectivity 2014: Data and Analysis on Broadband
Offerings in 24 Cities Across the World, Open Tech. Inst. (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.newamerica.org/
oti/the-cost-of-connectivity-2014/.
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have not graduated from high school and forty-six percent for Latinos.
The consequences of these disparities are significant. As one example,
consider that Latinos, even as the most underinsured group in the
country, have been the least likely to enroll in health insurance through
HealthCare.gov under the Affordable Care Act largely because of the
130
language barrier and a related distrust of government.
Race and ethnicity also figure into the availability and quality of
service in schools. According to one recent report, schools that serve
large populations of African American and Latino students are nearly
half as likely as predominately White schools to have access to
131
broadband.
Race, moreover, is significantly correlated with the kind of device
on which users rely to access the Internet. According to the Pew
Research Internet Project, for the past couple of years, Blacks and
Latinos have become almost twice as likely as Whites to rely on their
132
smartphones as their exclusive means of accessing the Internet. Even if
they are as likely as Whites to own any sort of mobile phone, researchers
have found that Blacks and Latinos report outsized reliance on smartphones
133
and other wireless devices to gain access to the Internet.
In some regards, this mobile trend is good news because it suggests a
134
way to close the “digital divide” in Internet access. Blacks and Latinos
use their wireless devices at greater rates to play music, record and watch
videos, access social networking sites, check their bank balance, or
participate in a video chat. Whatever intervention policymakers undertake,
they should explicitly consider that mobile broadband is the main way
through which historically underserved communities gain access.
But the new trend also is a peculiar kind of achievement since,
today, mobile service is not as speedy or reliable as wireline service on a
129. Patrick May, Poll: California’s Digital Divide Still Gaping, SiliconValley.com (July 8, 2014,
8:58 AM), http://www.siliconvalley.com/ci_26108198/poll-californias-digital-divide-still-gaping. These
statistics are notable because California is otherwise popularly understood to be where most online
innovation occurs.
130. See Cheryl Corley, Language Remains a Barrier in Latino Health Care Enrollment, NPR (Jan.
20, 2014, 7:44 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/01/20/263361444/language-remains-a-barrier-in-latinohealth-care-enrollment; April Dembosky, Selling Health Care to California’s Latinos Got Lost in
Translation, NPR (Mar. 6, 2014, 7:59 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2014/03/06/286226698/
selling-health-care-to-californias-latinos-got-lost-in-translation.
131. See John B. Horrigan, Alliance for Excellent Education, Schools and Broadband
Speeds: An Analysis of Gaps in Access to High-Speed Internet for African American, Latino,
Low-Income, and Rural Students 89 (2014).
132. Aaron Smith, Pew Research Ctr., 35% of American Adults Own a Smartphone 15 (July
2011) (finding specifically, thirty-eight percent of Black/Latino smartphone users rely on their
smartphones while seventeen percent of non-Hispanic Whites do so); Zickuhr & Smith, supra note 22,
at 19 (reflecting that this distribution might reflect the role of median income, since users with incomes
of less than $30,000 were more than twice as likely as those with incomes of $50,000 or more to do so).
133. Aaron Smith, Pew Research Ctr., African Americans and Technology Use (2014).
134. File & Ryan, supra note 103, at 12.
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variety of measures. First, the propagation characteristics of most wireless
service today does not yet afford anything close to the transmission speed
135
Second, while smartphone devices are
of fixed wireline service.
interactive and user-friendly, they generally do not deliver services or
opportunities anywhere near the range or depth as those offered by
136
PCs. Of course, mobile phones are more geographically flexible and, as
a result, afford a range of sophisticated location-based applications that
are less relevant for, say, a desktop computer. Still, the mobile device
experience is hardly as immersive. Specifically, mobile users’ search
engine entries are not as detailed or probing and the possibilities for
content creation are substantially limited. The most successful start-ups
137
and homework assignments rarely spring from a mobile device alone.
In short, broadband access through smartphones and tablets are simply
138
not a substitute for PCs.
C. The Costs of Disparity
Race, ethnicity, and income determine Internet access, adoption,
and use. Yet, we might downplay the disparities in broadband service as
long as they are not as egregious as disparities in, say, education, health
care access, or housing. We might just assume that the uneven
distribution of broadband service in the United States is not as worthy of
alarm if it just reflects a social arrangement that tolerates worse
disparities in those and other important areas of public life.
139
If the Internet is the dominant general use technology of our time,
however, broadband service disparities pose a far more perilous problem
than policymakers have yet to acknowledge. It does not matter that the
marginal Internet user has the mere potential to realize her respective
communicative capacity on a free and open Internet. Any regulatory
approach that allows service providers to privilege users and edge
providers with the wherewithal to pay for better connections would
undermine the core objective of communications law. Such specialized
treatment would effectively limit other users’ ability to pursue online
opportunities and curtail small developers’ relative ability to innovate.
Those who do not have the fastest broadband connections might be able
to invent, study space science, obtain good healthcare, or organize
movements. But they do so from a position of relative disadvantage. This is
to say nothing of the multifarious forms of learning and social engagement
that they would gain with faster or more reliable connections.
135. Noam, supra note 23, at 475 (explaining that fiber optic and cable technologies are “20 to 100
times as fast as optimistically projected 4G rates”).
136. Napoli & Obar, supra note 18, at 323, 326.
137. Id. at 327–29.
138. See Crawford, supra note 24, at 235556.
139. Cf. Plotkin, supra note 15.
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That broadband service disparities track deeply salient demographic
factors like race, ethnicity, and income is doubly alarming because, again,
if the Internet is the defining general use technology of our time, it will
perpetuate inequalities across substantive areas, no matter how altruistic
and innovative some networked elites are. This account undercuts the
trickle down theory of Internet innovation. It suggests that, even when
networks are open, extant structural patterns of exclusion will determine
the ways through which users will gain access to and experience the
Internet. Thus, to put it starkly, even though data transmissions on the
Internet do not consider race, ethnicity, or incomes, the quality of users’
respective connections refract through those persistent demographic
140
variables. Until policymakers do away with broadband service disparity,
economically and sociopolitically disadvantaged groups will not be able
to contribute to or enjoy the fruits of innovation online in the same way
that others do. Without positive intervention addressed to disparity-quadisparity, these disadvantages will worsen.
Of course, there are no guarantees that mere membership in
141
networks will yield benefits. The value of networks depends on so
much more, including the duration, intensity, and reciprocity of their
142
constituent connections. The relative advantage that privileged groups
hold in income, wealth, educational attainment, and job security, for
example, reproduces itself online and offline over time until it eventually
becomes entrenched in both. Unless substantially reversed, these
143
advantages become “durable”online and off. Exclusion in this way
144
worsens existing disadvantage.
The costs of cumulative disadvantage over time are great. Social
science research on social networks has shown that exclusion is costly
because inclusion, its opposite, has benefits that only accrue to

140. Cf. Osagie K. Obasogie, Blinded by Sight 181 (2014).
141. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community 19 (2000); see also Ben Fine, Social Capital Versus Social Theory: Political Economy
179–80, 182 (2001); Nan Lin, Building a Network Theory of Social Capital, in Social Capital: Theory
and Research 3, 11 (Nan Lin et al. eds., 2001).
142. See Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 Am. J. Soc. 1360 (1973).
143. Daria Roithmayr, Reproducing Racism: How Everyday Choices Lock in White
Advantage 5–7, 59–60, 110, 133 (2014); see id. at 88 (discussing work of Glenn Loury). Roithmayr
discusses the divide between Blacks and Whites; but social science research shows similar trends across
class and ethnicity as well. Residents in impoverished or otherwise materially underserved
communities across the country tend to remain in those circumstances only because their relative
opportunities are not as abundant. Id. at 89; see also William Julius Wilson, The Truly
Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy (1990); Loïc J. D. Wacquant &
William Julius Wilson, The Cost of Racial and Class Exclusion in the Inner City, 501 Annals of Am.
Acad. of Pol. & Soc. Sci. 8 (1989).
144. Crow, supra note 21.
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145

networked members over time. There is a measureable opportunity
cost for every minute a user is not as well connected as others. By way of
illustration, consider current controversies involving high-frequency
146
trading (“HFT”) in electronic securities exchanges. Highly leveraged
HFT firms design computer programs to execute high volume trades by
the millisecond in order to achieve the firms’ respective investment
147
strategies. By doing so, the firms expect to gain a quantifiable
advantage over competitors. The idea is that, even if any single trade
yields an infinitesimally small margin of profit, in the aggregate, such
efforts can prove profitable in even the most stable sectors of the economy.
To be sure, the distributional problems in the broadband setting are
far more complicated than those in electronic exchanges. But
developments in HFT dramatically illustrate the relative costs of exclusion
and disparity in informational networks. Firms with only mediocre or
conventional access to “market-moving” information will fail to stay
148
apace with better resourced competitors. Such disparity in the context
of electronic exchanges might be the cold reality of how capital markets
work. But, in the broadband setting, the costs of exclusion are far direr
because Internet access affords far more than the ability to trade on
“market-moving” information.
This is not just a theoretical claim. Internet access has real
implications in education, employment, and employability, for example.
Elementary and secondary school students who do not have adequate
online access at home risk falling behind their peers because, among
other things, they cannot complete Internet-related homework as easily
149
as their peers. Indeed, children’s grades improve when schools supply
computers through which the students can access the Internet from
150
home. Macroeconomic indicators suggest moreover that, when more

145. See Paul Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in Handbook of Theory and Research of the
Sociology of Education 46, 47–48 (J.G. Richardson ed., 1986); James S. Coleman, Foundations of
Social Theory 300–05 (1990); Nan Lin, Social Capital: A Theory of Structure and Action (2001);
Putnam, supra note 141, at 19; Barry Wellman, Structural Analysis: From Method and Metaphor to
Theory and Substance, in Social Structures: A Network Approach 19, 19–22 (Barry Wellman &
S.D. Berkowitz eds., 1988).
146. The SEC only authorized electronic exchanges in the late 1990s.
147. In short, an HFT firm’s algorithm monitors and processes market activity in one or more
sectors of the economy. When some threshold strategic condition is met, the program executes an
extremely high volume of trades on behalf of the firm in a matter of milliseconds. Rarely do these
firms hold a position for long; they only hold it as long as the algorithm deems necessary to minimize
risk and maximize gain of loss on every individual trade before other market actors can act.
148. To be sure, HFT helps bring more liquidity to the market and, as a result, arguably makes the
markets more efficient. But emergent HFT practices sometimes violate the letter if not the spirit of
SEC insider trading and fair disclosure rules meant to ensure that the investing public has equal access
to market-moving information.
149. Connected Texas, Broadband and Education––Connecting Students in Texas (2014).
150. Id.
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people are well connected, society as a whole benefits. For example,
even the smallest increases in broadband penetration rates are strongly
correlated with significant increases in the number of jobs and aggregate
152
household income in some areas. Users are also much more likely to be
politically engaged or to access government services when they have
153
reliable connections.
It is for these reasons that Congress’s primary charge to the FCC
under the Communications Act is to attend to substantive distributional
concerns. But the agency did not really evince any meaningful
recognition of this charge in its recent network neutrality proceeding
until public reaction forced it to do so. As I show in Part III below, the
agency has focused myopically on finding the right innovation balance.
To the extent the Commission has gestured toward redressing disparity,
it has come as a result of public pressure to consider equality concerns.
III. The Unintended Opening in the Open Internet Rules
In February 2015, the FCC substantially circumscribed the extent to
which access providers could leverage their market position to extract
154
fees from users and edge providers. The agency promulgated rules that
control the manner in which access providers may administer Internet
connections. The FCC asserts that the rules will ensure that access
providers remain “neutral” in how they manage those connections; that
is, access providers generally may not block or discriminate between
155
different kinds of applications or content.
Until very recently, the agency has had difficulty finding a statutory
basis for the intervention that the courts have been willing to accept. This
really was a problem of the FCC’s own creation: until just this past
February, the agency had classified the Internet under the Communications
Act as an “information service” deserving of the lightest of regulatory
oversight. In its final and most recent Open Internet Rules, however, the
agency has departed from this approach, basing the new rules on its
longstanding authority under the statute to regulate “telecommunications
service,” a regulatory category reserved for common carriers like
156
telephone companies.

151. See Dutz et al., supra note 115, at 35–36.
152. Connect Michigan, Broadband’s Economic Impact in Michigan 2–3 (2013).
153. Connect Ohio, Making Government Accessible: E-Government Usage in Ohio 3 (2014).
At the core of these material advantages of connection is the fact that users must be ready and
comfortable with the technology. Thus, many observers have argued that “digital readiness” is above
all else the most important determinant of online participation. See Horrigan, supra note 123, at 11–12.
154. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, supra note 7.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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The legal form of the rules has changed, but the substantive
justification has not. The “virtuous circle of network innovation and
infrastructure development” remains the prevailing regulatory ideology
at the FCC. The agency’s argument is that innovation in Internet
applications will generate more user interest that, in turn, will induce
access providers to invest in Internet infrastructure that, in turn, will
benefit everyone. This is the trickle down theory of Internet innovation.
This Part describes and critiques the way in which innovation has
manifested itself in communications policy, focusing in particular on the
Open Internet proceeding. It reviews the general content and form of the
rules that the agency proposed last spring and chronicles the agency’s
decision to settle on more robust regulation this past February. The
FCC’s decision to apply common carrier principles to the regulation of
broadband evinced its recognition of the Internet’s role and great
potential as a platform for social and economic integration. That is, by
classifying broadband as “telecommunications service” under Title II of
the Act, the agency has opened up a range of regulatory possibilities to
ensure that service providers take all users and edge providers as they
are; they cannot discriminate or interfere with connections on the basis
of content, applications, devices, or services.
This is an opening for the agency to recapture the statute’s core
objective. Part III demonstrates that, while innovation remains the
animating concern for the agency and other federal policymakers, the
FCC has shown a welcome interest in distributional fairness. But much
must be done. This Part argues that while innovation is a powerful and
useful concept, it is addressed to interests that are orthogonal to and
potentially in tension with the broad distributional objectives of
communications law.
A. The Proposed Rules
Last spring, the FCC proposed two different rules to promote the
157
“open Internet.” The agency’s stated objective for both was to
158
encourage application innovation. The proposed rules would do this by
forbidding broadband providers from blocking user access to the Internet
content, applications, service, and devices of their choice, as well as
barring them from unreasonably discriminating against lawful Internet
159
traffic. The proposed rules also would require access providers to be
transparent about their local broadband network management practices.
The agency also proposed a more flexible rule for mobile broadband

157. FCC, Fact Sheet: Chairman Wheeler Proposes Rules for Protecting the Open Internet
(Feb. 4, 2015), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2015/db0204/DOC-331869A1.pdf.
158. Id. at 1.
159. Id. at 2.
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providers, forbidding them only from blocking websites or competitors’
160
Mobile providers would not be barred from
voice applications.
161
unreasonably discriminating against network traffic.
But the two proposals took two different legal forms with important
substantive implications. The first would allow access providers to
negotiate “commercially reasonable” transmission terms with individual
content developers (or “edge providers”) who are willing to pay for the
specialized treatment. If broadband service were to remain an
“information service” under Title I of the Communications Act, and that
is what this first proposal would require, the agency would be required to
give access providers sufficient leeway to offer different transmission
terms to users and content providers. Under this first proposed rule,
broadband providers like Comcast, for example, would be able to deliver
content from Google (an “edge provider”) to subscribers much faster
than content from abc.com (another “edge provider”) as long as the
162
transmission terms with either company are “commercially reasonable.”
Under the proposal, the FCC would assess the validity of this kind of
163
prioritization on an adjudicatory case-by-case basis.
The FCC’s second proposal would explicitly bar providers from
discriminating between applications or application types, a practice that
the agency would allow under the first proposal as long as prioritization
is commercially reasonable. This second proposal would be authorized
under the agency’s statutory power to regulate “telecommunications
164
service” providers under Title II of the Communications Act. Under
this proposal, then, all or a part of local broadband network management
service would be reclassified as “telecommunications service” subject to
165
the common carrier obligations under Title II. That is, the agency
would no longer treat broadband service as an “information service”
under Title I, something it has done since 2002. Rather, pursuant to Title
II, the agency could forbid access providers, for example, from engaging
in “unjust or unreasonable discrimination” in charges or services to edge
166
providers. They could also require that access providers ensure that
users and edge providers can connect with each other “seamlessly and

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Brian Fung, FCC Chair: An Internet Fast Lane Would Be ‘Commercially Unreasonable,’
Wash. Post (May 20, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/05/20/fcc-chairan-internet-fast-lane-would-be-commercially-unreasonable/; see also Press Release, FCC, Statement
by FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler on Broadband Consumers and Internet Congestion (Jan. 29, 2015)
(on file with author).
163. Fung, supra note 162.
164. FCC, supra note 157, at 1.
165. Id.
166. See 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2015).
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transparently . . . between and across telecommunications networks.”
Thus, under this second proposal, Comcast could not offer a better deal
to Google on the basis of specialized (if also commercially reasonable)
terms; it would have to hold itself out to the public as available to
everyone on the same terms. The agency also invited comment on a
variation of the Title II proposal that would classify traffic from major
content developers as “telecommunications service.” This would include,
for example, remote delivery services or “‘sender-side’ traffic sent in
168
response to the subscriber.”
With both proposals, the FCC responded directly to a D.C. Circuit
panel’s January 2014 decision that the agency’s 2010 Open Internet
proposal, premised solely on Title I, did not make any allowances for
commercially reasonable bargaining between “information service
providers” and “edge providers.” The court concluded that, while the
2010 rules were rational enough to survive judicial scrutiny under the
169
Administrative Procedure Act, the Communications Act forbids them
if they require “information service providers” to treat all affiliated and
170
unaffiliated content equally. Such obligations, the panel explained,
resemble common carrier regulation that, according to the Communications
Act, the agency may impose only on “telecommunications service
171
providers.” The 2010 proposal could not stand because the FCC was
bound by its earlier decision to classify broadband as an “information
172
service” (and not as “telecommunications service”).
The first of the 2014 proposals, what I call the Title I proposal,
addressed the court’s concern by allowing for commercially reasonable
bargaining between access providers and edge providers. The second
proposal, what I call the Title II proposal, addressed the court’s concern
by reclassifying broadband as a telecommunications service that could be
subject to common carrier regulations under Title II.
Until very recently, the agency telegraphed a clear preference for
the Title I approach largely because the D.C. Circuit had already
173
affirmed that the agency has valid authority under that provision. The
Title II approach would require the agency to relitigate the question of
its authority.
After the close of the comment period, the FCC leaked a version of
the rules that would be premised on its authority under both Title I and

167. See 47 U.S.C. § 256 (1996); see also 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2015).
168. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, supra note 7.
169. See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 649 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The Commission has offered a
rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”).
170. See id. at 650.
171. 47 U.S.C. § 153(51) (2015).
172. Id.
173. See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 652.
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174

Title II of the Communications Act. This “hybrid” approach would
divide broadband into two separate kinds of services: retail service for
lay users that would be subject to Title I and “back-end” service for edge
providers that would be subject to Title II common carrier
175
requirements. This hybrid approach would, on the one hand, allow
access providers to differentiate lay users’ service quality based on the
latter’s willingness to pay and, on the other hand, address the FCC’s
interest in promoting application innovation. Prominent advocates of
network neutrality actually proposed this hybrid proposal in their public
176
comments to the agency.
The advantage of this approach is that it would not require the
agency to reverse its decision issued over a decade ago to classify
broadband service as an “information service” subject to Title I regulation.
It would only require amending the existing regime to redress the
177
wholesale distribution of edge providers’ data flows.
The hybrid approach, however, would also come with substantial
risks and disadvantages. Most observers already assumed that access
providers would challenge the rules no matter which form they took if
any aspect of the new rule were to impose common carrier
178
requirements. Access providers made that clear within hours after the
179
FCC first leaked the purported compromise.
B. The Public Response
The public reaction to the Title I and hybrid proposals was record
breaking for the FCC. The agency received nearly four million
comments. Their substance varied, of course, but the vast majority
supported some form of regulatory intervention that would limit access
180
providers’ ability to control transmission speeds and fees. They were
focused above all on the rank unfairness of allowing some users and edge
181
providers to have better and faster service than others.

174. See Edward Wyatt, F.C.C. Considering Hybrid Regulatory Approach to Net Neutrality, N.Y.
Times (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/01/technology/fcc-considering-hybrid-regulatoryapproach-to-net-neutrality.html?_r=0.
175. Id.
176. Adam Clark Estes, Mozilla Is Helping Tor Get Bigger and Better, Gizmodo (Nov. 10, 2014,
2:39 PM), http://gizmodo.com/mozilla-is-helping-tor-get-bigger-and-better-1656860653.
177. See Gautham Nagesh, FCC ‘Net Neutrality’ Plan Calls for More Power Over Broadband,
Wall St. J. (Oct. 30, 2014, 7:41 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fcc-net-neutrality-plan-calls-formore-power-over-broadband-1414712501?autologin=y.
178. See Jenna Greene, Telecoms Poised to Fight Obama’s Net-Neutrality Proposal, Nat’l L.J.
(Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202676472698.
179. Id.
180. Lohr, supra note 27.
181. Id.
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The cause was taken up by many others as well. Comedian and talk
show host John Oliver sarcastically likened the FCC’s Title I proposal to
airline travel, with most users getting something like the least
comfortable seats and large Internet companies like Google and Amazon
182
routinely getting first class treatment. Former FCC Commissioner
Michael Copps similarly asserted in testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee that, without aggressive regulatory intervention, the
Internet could “become the playground of the privileged few that only
widens the many divides that are creating a stratified and unequal
America . . . [We are] heading toward an online future with fast lanes for
183
the 1 % and slow lanes for the 99%[.]”
The hybrid approach, too, encountered stiff opposition. The
resistance came from public interest groups, public figures, and other
advocates who argued that the hybrid approach would still allow access
providers to offer tiered levels of service as long as they were offered at
184
commercially reasonable terms. Such tiering, opponents argued, would
185
undermine innovation by users of all stripes. Advocates also observed
that the drafters of the hybrid approach would have to address the
requirement that “telecommunication services” under Title II must offer
their service “for a fee.” Access providers do not currently charge
websites and other edge providers a dedicated fee to connect to law
users, nor would advocates of network neutrality want them to, as those
fees would make it that much more costly for lay users to start online
186
ventures.
Apart from public concern about the legal form of the rules, there
were also questions about how the rules would treat transmissions across
the backbone of the Internet, from originating service provider to
terminating provider. To focus solely on the positive duties of local
access providers in the last mile would be naïve since local access
providers are not the only administrators of Internet connections. Large
transit network operators like Cogent and Level 3 manage Internet
traffic between local providers on behalf of prominent edge providers
187
like Apple, Netflix, and Google. They do so through “peering”

182. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Net Neutrality (HBO television broadcast June 1, 2014).
183. Preserving an Open Internet: Rules to Promote Competition and Protect Main Street
Consumers: Sen. Judiciary Comm. Field Hearing (2014) (testimony of Hon. Michael J. Copps).
184. See Jon Healey, Possible ‘Hybrid’ Net Neutrality Rules Get Chilly Reception, L.A. Times (Oct.
31, 2014, 3:01 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-fcc-net-neutrality-hybrid-20141031-story.
html#page=1.
185. See Barbara van Schewick, Will the FCC Ruin the Internet?, CNN (Nov. 7, 2014, 4:17 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/07/opinion/van-schewick-net-neutrality/index.html.
186. See id.; Healey, supra note 184.
187. Robert McMillian, What Everyone Gets Wrong in the Debate over Net Neutrality, Wired (June
23, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/06/net_neutrality_missing/; Dan Rayburn, Apple
Negotiating Paid Interconnect Deals with ISPs for Their Own CDN, StreamingMediaBlog.com (May
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188

agreements on interconnection terms. Second, and more importantly,
some large edge providers are entering into their own co-location
agreements with local providers. Companies likes Google and Netflix
have built content delivery networks and dedicated servers within last
mile providers’ networks, giving them an advantage over competitors.
The alternative is to rely on conventional “best effort” transmission
protocols that are not well suited to their latency-sensitive high-bandwidth
content that they transmit.
C. The Final Rules
The record-breaking public reaction to the proposed rules has to
189
have a real impact on the agency’s decisionmaking. This past February,
the FCC approved a flat ban on blocking, discrimination, and paid
190
prioritization by fixed and mobile wireless providers. In short, the new
rules prohibit:
 blocking access to Internet “content, applications, services, and
devices”;
 impairing “Internet traffic on the basis of content, applications,
services,” and devices; and
 prioritizing any Internet traffic “in exchange for consideration” or
191
prioritizing affiliated content, applications, and services.

The agency relied on its authority under Section 706 in Title I of the
192
Communications Act, as well as its separate authority under Title II.
The Commission cited the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision last
year to affirm that Section 706 supplied sufficient authority to regulate
last-mile providers. The agency also found support in the court’s opinion
193
for its claim to authority under Title II. Thus, in unequivocal terms, in
these new rules, the agency has classified broadband as a telecommunication
service subject to the traditional common carrier bar on discriminating
between content, applications, and services.

20, 2014, 10:15 AM), http://blog.streamingmedia.com/2014/05/apple-negotiating-paid-interconnect-dealswith-isps-for-their-own-cdn.html; see also Joan Engerbretson, Level3 Wants FCC to Impose ISP
Interconnection Requirements, Telecompetitor (July 8, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.telecompetitor.com/
level3-wants-fcc-impose-isp-interconnection-requirements/.
188. McMillian, supra note 187; Rayburn, supra note 187.
189. See Rob Faris et al., Score Another One for the Internet? The Role of the Networked Public
Sphere in the U.S. Net Neutrality Policy Debate, Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y at Harvard U. 4
(Feb. 10, 2015).
190. It also reiterated the requirement that providers be transparent about their network
management practices. The transparency requirement, however, was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit.
Nothing in the rule altered or broadened this requirement.
191. See FCC, supra note 157, at 2.
192. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, supra note 7, ¶¶ 5, 7 & 273–84.
193. Id.
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As enshrined in the Act, the nondiscrimination principle in no
uncertain terms forbids service providers from imposing
unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications,
regulations, facilities, or services for or in connection with like
communication service, directly or indirectly, by any means or device,
or to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage
to any particular person, class of persons, or locality, or to subject any
particular person, class of persons, or locality to any undue or
194
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.

As broadly written as this provision and related provisions might be, the
agency has chosen not to apply the full sweep of common carrier
obligations. Congress authorized the FCC to “forbear” from
enforcement of certain requirements under Title II if “the public
interest” requires it. In the new rules, the agency has invoked this power
to announce that it will refrain from imposing duties that are otherwise
applicable to telephone companies and other common carriers. Specifically,
in the new rules, the FCC announced that it will forbear from imposing rate
regulations or tariffs, pro-competitive unbundling requirements, and
195
filing or accounting requirements. Such an approach, the Chairman has
explained, is better tailored to the twenty-first century.
Even after forbearing on enforcement of some common carrier
requirements, however, the rules are far more robust than what the
196
Chairman was forecasting during the comment period last summer.
They are certainly more stringent than most of the alternatives that the
FCC has publicly considered for over the past decade. Among other
things, the new rules generally forbid broadband providers from
privileging one edge provider’s applications and content over another’s,
irrespective of whether the preference is commercially reasonable. The
bar on paid prioritization in particular protects against a wide range of
schemes through which providers could advantage specific content and
applications for any legal “consideration.” Drafted in this way, the rules
ostensibly bar paid prioritization schemes as well as the emergent
practice of “zero-rating” or “positive price discrimination.”
The rules also implemented a wide range of procedures and
obligations otherwise applicable to common carriers. For example, the

194. 47 U.S.C. § 202 (2015).
195. Forbearance here raises interesting questions. First, in the agency’s framing, the “public
interest” requires that it forbear from applying certain provisions of Title II. It is hard to know,
however, how far the agency may go without more clarity on what the “public interest” entails in this
setting. Second, the Administrative Procedure Act requires the agency to subject substantive
regulatory revisions to public notice and comment. The agency’s action also raises interesting
questions about whether it must subject any modification of its forbearance decision in this most
recent Order to notice and comment.
196. Tom Wheeler, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler: This Is How We Will Ensure Net Neutrality,
Wired (Feb. 4, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/02/fcc-chairman-wheeler-net-neutrality/.
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FCC would be able to investigate consumer complaints and enforce
197
related provisions. Providers will also have to abide by consumer privacy
198
rules, ensure equal access to indispensable physical infrastructure like
199
poles and conduits to competitors, and provide access to people with
200
disabilities.
Finally, the rules also address the interconnection terms between
the large transit network operators like Cogent Communications (who
carry Netflix and other major edge providers’ data) and the local
201
broadband providers. The latter are the gatekeepers to users. The new
rules assert for the first time that the FCC has the authority to review
202
interconnection practices that are not “just and reasonable.”
Together, these new Open Internet Rules represent a
modernization of the requirements under Title II in that they incorporate
nondiscrimination and other principles in common carrier regulation. At
the same time, however, by invoking its forbearance authority under
Section 706, the agency has signaled its intention to be far more flexible
than Title II would otherwise allow. Thus, the agency will refrain from
imposing rate regulation, unbundling requirements, new taxes, new fees,
203
“or other forms of utility regulation.”
IV. Toward Network Equality
The public’s reaction to the FCC’s original Open Internet proposal
in 2014 was not as concerned with the form or pace of innovation as the
unadorned problem of disparity. The main criticism was that the status
quo is unfair to the extent it permits “fast lanes” for firms and developers
who can afford prioritized treatment and slower connections for users
204
and “start-up companies that do not have the cash to pay the tolls.”
This response was consistent with contemporaneous polling that showed
205
overwhelming majority support for more robust Open Internet Rules.

197. FCC, supra note 157, at 2; see also 47 U.S.C. § 208 (2015); id. §§ 206, 207, 209, 216, 217.
198. FCC, supra note 157, at 3; see also 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2015).
199. FCC, supra note 157, at 3; see also 47 U.S.C. § 224 (2015).
200. FCC, supra note 157, at 3; see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 255 (2015).
201. See Todd Shields, Netflix Deals with Broadband Providers Said to Be Getting New FCC
Oversight, Bloomberg Bus. (Jan. 28, 2014; 4:07 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201501-28/netflix-deals-with-broadband-providers-said-to-get-fcc-oversight.
202. See id.
203. FCC, supra note 157.
204. See Wyatt, supra note 27.
205. Mario Trujillo, Poll: Voters Support Broad Concept of Net Neutrality, Hill (Jan. 21, 2015,
10:31 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/230226-poll-voters-support-broad-concept-of-net-neutrality
(showing support for restrictions on “blocking, discriminating against, slowing down, or charging for
Internet traffic to certain websites”); see also Press Release, Univ. of Del. Ctr. for Political Commc’n,
National Survey Shows Public Overwhelmingly Opposes Internet “Fast Lanes” (Nov. 10, 2014) (on file
with author).
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The FCC Chairman was clearly affected by the public reaction. By
the time the agency published its final rules, he explicitly acknowledged
the naïveté of the unmodified trickle down approach, even assuming
206
personal responsibility for the agency’s position before the switch. The
rules accordingly now subject broadband service to unequivocal
207
So, even as
nondiscrimination and other common carrier rules.
policymakers at the FCC continue to believe above all that the Internet
is a platform for innovation, it also now seems to recognize that the
relative quality of users’ access should be a part of the public policy
calculus.
Although welcome, the FCC’s approach is insufficient to remedy
the deep disparities outlined in Part II. Policymakers can and must do
much more. Under the view I propose here, the Internet is not simply a
boutique curiosity with which engineers and computer scientists should
be allowed to tinker. Nor is it simply a data rich resource for inventors
and companies to exploit. The controlling view ought to be that
broadband is a service like electricitythat it is an essential general use
resource to which everyone should have the same or nearly the same
208
access as a matter of course. Accordingly, the longstanding and
uncontroversial central objective of communications law and
policyuniversalityshould displace (or at least complement) the
preoccupation with innovation.
The statutory commitment to universal broadband deployment is
better understood as a concern for substantive equality in the delivery of
communication services. As explained in Part I, the amended
Communications Act speaks in relative terms about broadband availability.
It provides, for example, that telecommunications and information service
and rates in all areas of the country must be “reasonably comparable to”
209
the best available service. The clear implication is that the success of
deployment depends on whether broadband is available to all users on
relatively similar terms, no matter whom or where the subscribers are.

206. See Wheeler, supra note 196 (“Originally, I believed that the FCC could assure internet
openness through a determination of ‘commercial reasonableness’ under Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. While a recent court decision seemed to draw a roadmap for using
this approach, I became concerned that this relatively new concept might, down the road, be
interpreted to mean what is reasonable for commercial interests, not consumers.”).
207. This shift does not raise notice problems under the Administrative Procedure Act because the
agency made clear in its notice of public rulemaking that it was also considering reclassifying
broadband as a Title II common carrier. See generally Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. Block, 755 F.2d
1098, 1102 (4th Cir. 1985) (“Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires that the
notice in the Federal Register of a proposed rulemaking contain ‘either the terms or substance of the
proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.’”).
208. See Tom Vilsack & Penny Pritzer, Broadband: The Electricity of the 21st Century, White House
(Jan. 15, 2015, 10:20 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/01/15/broadband-electricity-21st-century.
209. 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(3) (2015).
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This final Part lays out the contours of what network equality
requires as a matter of policy and research. First, I make the positive
argument for its distinctivenessthat is, in relation to the prevailing
approach. Second, I identify several examples in current federal
policymaking that showcase how a particularized focus on network
equality has begun (and should continue) to shape communications
policymaking. In the end, I offer this Part as the foundation for more policy
and scholarly work in the area.
A. Substantive Communications Equality
As demonstrated above, the prevailing view of the Internet among
communications policymakers and scholars is that it is something like an
innovation machine. Some scholars, however, have developed modified
versions of the view favoring innovation that are not as myopically
devoted to the trickle down theory. One prominent claim, for example, is
that the Internet, in addition to being an engine for commerce, is also a
“public and social infrastructure” whose social value “is tied to the range
of capabilities it provides for individuals, firms, households, and other
organizations to interact with each other and to participate in various
210
activities and social systems.” According to this conception, Internet
participation has spillover effects that benefit the most active users, as
211
well as those who are not online. YouTube, for example, is not just
beneficial because it creates value for Google, its parent company, or for
users who post videos, but because it also “incidentally generate[s]”
212
value for the users who watch the content. Sometimes these secondary
benefits are small in scale; sometimes they are big. But all users are
beneficiaries.
This approach is essentially a restatement of the prevailing trickle
down theory to the extent it posits that everyone in society is the
213
downstream beneficiary of innovation on the Open Internet. It asserts
that the Internet’s main value is generated by the transformative “killer
214
apps” designed by networked elites. Here, universality is also important,
but only instrumentally or secondarily so.
Other scholars are far more direct in their claim that universal
deployment ought to guide public policy. Even for these scholars,
however, universality is an instrumental good that helps to stimulate

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Brett M. Frischmann, Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources 336 (2012).
Id. at 337.
Id. at 338–39.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 338.
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215

economic growth. This view holds that, if robust nondiscrimination
rules are in place, every additional participant and connection increases
the probability of new synergies and collaborations, which, in turn will
216
contribute to economic growth.
To be sure, broad and unimpeded connections to YouTube or
Facebook can generate socially valuable macroeconomic spillover effects
217
for society at large. But my claim here is both more general and
particular than this. I argue that, apart from the increases in general
social welfare, universal access and use create opportunities for social
integration for users who are excluded or otherwise structurally
disadvantaged in society generally. This contention is partly born from
the positive terms of the Communications Act itself: that all Americans
must have reasonably comparable broadband service irrespective of
218
whom or where they are. Under law, it does not matter whether they
contribute to innovation in any appreciable way.
This claim for universality, however, really flows from the normative
commitment that communications are social and relational by their
nature, and that they generate a sense of inclusion and solidarity that is
219
itself valuable. This claim is especially salient for the least fortunate
among us. That is, promoting and protecting communications equality is
redistributive in the same way racial integration is. Internet connections
are the means by which people associate with and otherwise engage their
culture in ways that are harder to do without a network connection. We
might frame this in purely welfarist terms. As I observe in Part II, there
are strong correlations between online participation rates in local
communities and higher employment rates and income. With greater
connectivity, historically disadvantaged communities are likelier to
become active participants in the economy and culture.
But we can go further: regulations and programs that promote and
protect network equality help to redress the structural barriers that
historically disadvantaged groups in the United States routinely experience
in all other aspects of public life. We might assume that this is nothing
more than a question of semanticsthat I employ the language of
equality and integration, where the prevailing approach relies on tropes
220
in economics and network theory. That assumption, however, would
misunderstand the point of my argument here. I argue for a reorientation

215. See Crawford, supra note 47, at 390; Richard S. Whitt & Stephen J. Schultze, The New
“Emergence Economics” of Innovation and Growth, and What It Means for Communications Policy,
7 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 217, 263 (2009).
216. See Crawford, supra note 47, at 390; Whitt & Schultze, supra note 215, at 263.
217. Cf. Sylvain, supra note 30.
218. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(b) (2015).
219. Cf. Sylvain, supra note 30.
220. Cf. Kang, supra note 31, at 6–7.
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toward network equality because the prevailing approach has things
backwards. At least, the prevailing trickle down theory overemphasizes
the material consequences of broadband deployment at the expense of
the statutory and normative reasons for equality and integration. The
statutory command to ensure network equality matters, I argue, because
it charges policymakers to take affirmative steps to give everyone an
opportunity to engage (that is, benefit from and add to) online
opportunities and associations irrespective of who or where they are.
And the reasons for this are important. Broadband is the gateway to a
vast world of services and opportunities otherwise beyond many users’
structurally impaired reach; the Internet is a transformative general use
technology that could reverse historical and existing patterns of
oppression, discrimination, bias, and harassment because it is so
pervasive and indispensable.
In this way, my argument here takes up an observation that scholar
Jerry Kang made eight years ago. In Race.Net Neutrality, Kang
presciently puzzled through the contrasting ways in which scholars
conceived of nondiscrimination in the network neutrality debate (back
221
then) by comparing it to the law and language of civil rights. In the
network neutrality debate, he explained, consequentialist arguments
tended to predominate; in the context of civil rights, however, scholars
and policymakers were likelier to invoke non-welfarist deontological
222
concerns. Kang argued that, at a theoretical level, however, there is
nothing inevitable or natural about the contrast in approaches. After all,
he observed, many grassroots network neutrality activists invoked
223
deontological concepts of democratic participation and free speech.
But, for whatever reasons, Kang continued, those deontological concerns
did not have currency in the mainstream policy debate about broadband
network management policy where welfarist considerations prevailed.
Little had changed until the FCC adopted the current Open Internet
Rules. Today, the deontological equality concerns that animate civil
rights policymaking have found themselves in the FCC’s rationalization
for network neutrality. To be sure, the agency continues to rely above all
on the trickle down theory to frame the legal basis of the rule. But, as
discussed above, the agency has also evinced worry about disparity as
such. This pivot has not merely been semantic. The agency relied on this
concern in part to overtly reject the argument that service providers
should be able to discriminate between users or edge providers, or
apportion the quality of service based on the underlying service,
applications, or content as long as commercially reasonable. To do so,

221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 8.
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the agency now asserts, would create disparities between the haves and
the have-nots.
To be clear, my argument here is not to remove consequentialism
from policymaking in this area altogether. Even civil rights law and
policy today recognizes that the best evidence of illegal discrimination is
often in its quantifiable ex post discriminatory impact. Illegal
discrimination is not just measured by the evidence of the wrongdoer’s
bigotry because most bigots now know better than to advertise their
biases. Policymakers and courts recognize that the most useful measure
of illegal discrimination in most settings is in the lived and calculable
224
effects on protected groups. It is for this reason that most progressive
civil rights laws attend to the ways in which the decisions of policymakers
or private actors have a discriminatory impact on protected classes.
Importantly, however, the measure of discriminatory impact operates in
service of the core interest in promoting equality. Similarly,
communications policymakers should come to understand the nature of
disparity by understanding the empirical measure of “discrimination on
225
the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.”
B. Current Interventions in Furtherance of Equality
Outside of the network neutrality debate, equality concerns have
taken center stage in communication policy generally. This new focus has
found expression, first, in fiscal policy and, second, in the positive
regulation of broadband service generally. The first is comprised of
substantial subsidies through the FCC as well as the Departments of
Agriculture and Commerce to support broadband to the underserved
and unserved. These take the form of means-tested discounts on monthly
service fees, as well as direct grants to schools. The second set of
interventions showcases the agency’s broad positive authority to redress
disparity. Three recent interventions in particular are worth considering
here. They generally include, of course, the Open Internet Rules, but
here, I focus in particular on the decision by the FCC to treat mobile and
fixed broadband providers equally. Other interventions along these lines,
however, include the FCC’s recent decisions, first, to increase the
regulatory definition of broadband and, second, to preempt state laws
that forbid municipal participation in the market for broadband service
delivery.
All of these efforts seek one way or another to ensure that users and
communities everywhere in the United States have an equal or at least a
“reasonably comparable” opportunity to access the affordances of the

224. See, e.g., Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2521 (2015).
225. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2015).
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Internet. In this vein, the new Open Internet Rules are just a piece of the
FCC’s regulatory turn toward broadband equality. Together, these
interventions come far closer to actualizing the core objectives of the
Communications Act than does the mere focus on innovation.
1.

Fiscal Policy

Policymakers have employed a variety of regulatory strategies to
ensure that as many members of the public have broadband service as
possible, notwithstanding the limitations imposed by access providers.
226
The most direct interventions to this point have been in fiscal policy.
Congress devised a partial solution for broadband disparity in the
amended Communications Act. Among other things, it established
federal subsidy programs with the intention of addressing structural
disparities in the availability of communications services. Section 254 of
the amended Communications Act in particular establishes a relatively
elaborate process for assuring universal service. Under this provision in
particular, the quality and cost of broadband service in all rural and high227
cost areas are on par with service and cost in cities. The FCC explicitly
recognized that these provisions could very well apply pursuant to the
228
agency’s decision to classify broadband as a telecommunications service.
Moreover, in 2009, as part of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (“ARRA”), Congress allocated a little over $7 billion
in grant and loan programs to expand deployment and adoption in
unserved and underserved areas throughout the country. Under that law,
Congress charged the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture with
229
the responsibility of administering these programs.
Congress has attempted to close the service gap in other ways as
well. In 1996, for example, it created the “E-Rate program” in order to
230
make broadband connectivity more affordable for schools and libraries.
Recently, the FCC announced that it would modernize the program in
231
order to tackle deficient service in schools and libraries. The new rules
require greater pricing transparency and consolidated purchasing
systems, as well as expand funding to provide Wi-Fi networks at schools

226. See Sylvain, supra note 108.
227. 47 U.S.C. § 254(b) (2015).
228. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, supra note 7 (asserting that it will not forbear
from applying aspects of § 254).
229. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–5, 123 Stat. 115, 128
(2009); see also Sylvain, supra note 108.
230. See FCC, Universal Service Program for Schools and Libraries (E-Rate) (2014).
231. See FCC, Fact Sheet: FCC Chairman Wheeler’s Plan to Reboot the E-Rate Program to Meet
the Needs of the 21st Century Digital Learning, http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/
2014/db1117/DOC-330508A1.pdf.
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and libraries in rural and poor school districts and to better enforce
232
current rules.
Very recently, moreover, FCC Chairman Wheeler announced an
initiative to expand the current means-tested program for telephone
service to cover broadband as well. Since the 1980s, the Lifeline program
sought to build on the recognition that landlines “had become crucial to
233
full participation in our society and economy.” Chairman Wheeler’s
proposed reform would allow eligible residential subscribers to use the
same subsidy of about ten dollars per month that they get for phone
234
service to help cover the cost of broadband at home.
The FCC also has made it one of its top priorities over the past few
years to extend and accelerate fixed and mobile broadband deployment
235
to all of the places in which Americans live, work, and travel. Among
other things, for example, it administers the high-cost universal service
236
program and the Connect America Fund. The high-cost universal
service program provides direct subsidies toward deployment. Through
the Connect America Fund, the FCC invests in the construction of
237
broadband networks in cooperation with access providers. There, the
FCC has invested more than $438 million to bring service to 1.6 million
people and intends on spending almost $9 billion in remote rural areas in
238
the next five years. Other programs, while not as ambitious, are
directed at resolving the same problem. The Mobility Fund, for example,
provides one-time grants to construct next-generation mobile networks
239
for communities in which there is none.
President Barack Obama, moreover, signed Executive Order 13616
in 2012 in order to promote broadband deployment in federal buildings
240
and rights-of-way. The Order’s central objective is to coordinate
procedures and policies across federal agencies that have substantial land
ownership or management responsibilities in order to assure that, when

232. Modernizing the E-Rate Program for Schools and Libraries, WC Docket No. 13-184, Report
and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (July 23, 2014).
233. MTS and WATS Market Structure, and Amendment of Parts 67 & 69 of the Commission’s
Rules and Establishment of a Joint Board, 50 Fed. Reg. 939 (Jan. 8, 1985).
234. See Press Release, FCC, FCC Chairman Wheeler Seeks Comment on Modernizing Lifeline to
Make 21st Century Broadband Affordable for Low-Income Households (May 28, 2015) (on file with
author).
235. Connect America Fund, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Nov. 18, 2011).
236. Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at 10,345–46 ¶ 4.
237. Id.
238. Sean Buckley, FCC’s Connect America Fund II Receives Mixed Response, FierceTelecom (Apr. 25,
2014), http://www.fiercetelecom.com/story/fccs-connect-america-fund-ii-receives-mixed-response/2014-04-25.
239. Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra note 19, at 10,351–52 ¶ 12.
240. See Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Executive Order—Accelerating
Broadband Infrastructure Deployment (June 14, 2012) (on file with author).
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possible, federal resources are used to lay infrastructure in service of
241
broad deployment.
All of these efforts appear to have had a positive effect on
deployment and adoption rates. The postmortem has yet to be written on
the ARRA’s investment in broadband infrastructure, but that single
intervention has gone further than most initiatives to bring high-speed
broadband service to underserved communities. Clearly, however, fiscal
policy interventions like these are not sustainable if they depend on
shifting political winds. Something more will be needed in policy and law.
2.

Standardized Minimum Speed Thresholds

Another way in which policymakers have promoted broader and
more equal access is by requiring Internet access providers to supply a
minimum quantum of transmission speed to qualify as a broadband
provider. The threshold is a purely regulatory term of art, not an
engineering concept. The agency has used it to create incentives for the
deployment of broadband in high-cost and rural areas. The speed
definition operates as a carrot rather than stick, because providers are
entitled to some of the funding I identify above in Part IV.B.1 if they
supply broadband service.
Pursuant to its obligation to “review and reset” the broadband
242
standard periodically, the FCC in January 2015 upgraded the threshold
definition of broadband to 25 Mbps for downloads and 3 Mbps for
uploads. This reform represents a substantial change from the 4/1
benchmark it set just in 2010 which, at the time, was a remarkable
increase from the now laughable 200 kbs standard, which only supports
243
applications like e-mail. Before 2010, when the FCC implemented the
4/1 standard, the speed benchmark was 200 kbps in both directions,
which afforded little more than e-mail and the most elemental web
244
surfing. The 2010 4/1 Mbps benchmark, on the other hand, enabled
245
users to send and receive high-quality voice and video services.

241. Id.
242. Id. at 10361 ¶ 20; FCC, Connecting America: The National Broadband Plan 135 (2010).
243. Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment
Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Amended by the Broadband
Improvement Act, GN Docket No. 11-121, 25 FCC Rcd. 9556, 9559 ¶ 4 (2010).
244. The FCC revisits the benchmark every four years. Eighth Broadband Progress Report, supra
note 19, at 10,361 ¶ 20; FCC, supra note 242, at 135.
245. For context: today, users need about 3 Mbps to 4 Mbps to support video chatting, 5 Mbps to
stream high definition movies, and 10 Mbps to 20 Mbps to support digital software distribution. See
generally Peter Bowen & Shawn Hoy, OBI Broadband Performance 9 (FCC, Technical Paper No. 4,
2011) (listing types of online content and services and the broadband data rates required by that
content or service); Help Center, Internet Connection Speed Recommendations, Netflix,
https://help.netflix.com/en/node/306 (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
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Service providers are likely to take up the FCC’s lead since
consumers continue to demand faster broadband speeds to support new
applications. Cloud storage, teleworking, gaming, and video streaming
246
applications have become central to everyday life for many Americans,
and all, one way or another, require or accommodate speeds that far
exceed conventional consumer-grade service of just five years ago.
The new standard also better represents the current state of affairs
since most providers purport to make at least 25 Mbps available to their
subscribers. Generally, users who can afford it already have download
speeds of 30 Mbps or higher. But, under the new definition, nearly
twenty percent of homes in the United States would be in areas without
247
248
such service. The majority of these areas are in rural areas.
Google, meanwhile, has invested in fiber optic networks in a few
major U.S. cities that support more or less one gigabit per second upload
and download speeds, one thousand times faster than the current FCC
249
The Google Fiber service,
benchmark for upload connections.
moreover, costs about as much if not a little bit more than the most basic
broadband service elsewhere around the country. The company
accordingly offers casual users the same service speed for which
250
generally only the largest companies pay ten times the price.
To be sure, some of the Google Fiber project is promotional
gimmickry for the online search and advertising giant. On the other
hand, the promise of new data capacity and fast transmission speed has
spawned a niche market for innovative applications. The right question is
not: why would anyone need “ultra high-speed” broadband? Rather, the
better question is: which will be the next “killer application” to make us
wish we all had such service? The robust competitive threat that Google
Fiber poses could also motivate incumbents to invest more and improve
service for consumers in the near future, at least in the markets in which
Google has invested.

246. See Exec. Office of the President, supra note 12.
247. Jon Brodkin, Tons of AT&T and Verizon Customers May No Longer Have “Broadband”
Tomorrow, ArsTechnica (Jan. 28, 2015, 10:10 AM), http://arstechnica.com/business/2015/01/tons-ofatt-and-verizon-customers-may-no-longer-have-broadband-tomorrow/. The FCC assumes that about
seventeen percent of the population lacks access to this level of service, with over half of all rural
Americans lacking access. See Press Release, FCC, FCC Finds U.S. Broadband Deployment Not
Keeping Pace: Updates Broadband Speed Benchmark to 25 Mbps/3Mbps to Reflect Consumer
Demand, Advances in Technology (Jan. 29, 2015) (on file with author).
248. Press Release, supra note 247.
249. Minnie Ingersoll & James Kelly, Think Big with a Gig: Our Experimental Fiber Network,
Google Blog (Feb. 10, 2010), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/02/think-big-with-gig-ourexperimental.html.
250. Farhad Manjoo, What Do You Do with the World’s Fastest Internet Service?, Slate (Mar. 12,
2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2013/03/google_fiber_review_nobody_knows_
what_to_do_with_the_world_s_fastest_internet.html.
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In any event, Google Fiber is just the beginning. Further
improvements beyond one gigabit per second are on the horizon.
Recently, for example, engineers discovered a method by which existing
copper phone lines could actually support broadband speeds of up to ten
251
gigabits per second at a fraction of the cost of current service. XG-Fast,
as it is called, will enable providers to supply much faster service at far
cheaper cost than they do today with existing fiber optic transmission
technologies. The researchers behind this finding expect that users will
begin to benefit from the discovery within the next year.
XG-Fast represents the state of the art in transmission speed. In its
most recent action, the agency explicitly asserted that it was merely
upgrading the definition in order to meet consumer demand for new
services that require more generous speed thresholds. In fact, providers
around the country already had been providing speeds well over 25
252
Mbps. The new standard just keeps the FCC up to speed on current
services already available to most Americans. On this reasoning, the
agency surely will have to reform the standard before long yet again.
But the reform does more than keep up with current trends in
service and new applications. The agency explicitly concluded that the
speed upgrade would also reduce disparities experienced by underserved
communities. After all, more than half of rural inhabitants lack access to
253
high-speed broadband service. Current high-speed broadband service,
it explained, is too valuable to be available to only a portion of potential
users. The agency explicitly invoked its responsibility under Section 706
to “expand robust broadband to all Americans in a timely way” to justify
the benchmark reform.
There are notable regulatory consequences of the agency’s reform
of the broadband speed benchmark. As noted above, the agency
subsidizes providers to improve and more widely deploy broadband
infrastructure. Only companies that provide broadband as the agency
defines it could be entitled to such support. Support like this could make
it easier for smaller emergent high-speed providers to enter markets in
which incumbents have failed to provide high-speed service. In these

251. See Brian Fung, This Practically Ancient Internet Technology Supports Speeds 1,000 Times the
National Average, Wash. Post (July 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/
07/10/this-practically-ancient-internet-technology-supports-speeds-1000-times-the-national-average/.
252. Today, users generally require about 3 to 4 Mbps to support video chatting and 5 Mbps to
stream high definition movies. See Bowen & Hoy, supra note 245; Help Center, Internet Connection
Speed Recommendations, supra note 245. Users need at least 15 Mbps download speed to perform
“basic functions plus more than one high demand application running at the same time.” Inquiry
Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a
Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to
Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data
Improvement Act, GN Docket No. 14-126, Tenth Broadband Progress Notice of Inquiry 7 (2014).
253. Press Release, supra note 247.
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ways, the standard is another lever on which the agency can rely to
assure delivery of high quality service to all Americans.
3.

The Same Rules for Wireless Devices

A third way by which federal policymakers have redressed racial,
ethnic, and class disparities in broadband use is by requiring mobile
providers to adhere to the same rules that fixed providers must follow.
The Open Internet Rules do this by banning discrimination based on the
device users rely on to connect to the Internet.
Over half of Internet traffic travels over wireless networks. And
more people today are relying on very high-quality wireless services to
receive and transmit high-quality content and applications. Where, in
2010, about 200,000 Americans subscribed to the fastest mobile broadband
services, today, more than 120 million do, and almost 300 million users
254
Today,
subscribe to some high-speed mobile network service.
distinguishing wireless service from fixed service makes little sense; they
all comprise broadband service.
Recognizing as much, the FCC decided to address its final rules to
all broadband providersfixed and wirelessand, accordingly, extended
protection to all users in equal measure no matter which devices they use
to go online. This is a shift from the agency’s proposal in May 2014 to
impose fewer requirements on mobile providers. The argument then, as
it was four years before, was that wireless service was in its infancy and
that service rules would impede innovation.
The FCC’s Open Internet Rules reflect the important recognition
among policymakers that, while wireless transmission speeds are closing
in on fixed broadband speeds, different communities gain access to the
Internet in different ways. That is, while mobile broadband use rates
have climbed steadily across demographic groups from about thirty
percent in 2010 to around fifty-five percent today, it remains the primary
way of going online for a disproportionately higher number of rural
residents and low income users, as well as Blacks and Latinos. Nearly
two-thirds of Latinos rely on mobile connections to go online. And,
according to some research, Blacks and Latinos have been early adopters
of mobile technology, or at least are more likely to own a smartphone
255
than Whites. The new rules accordingly redress another piece of
disparity by recognizing that different communities access the Internet

254. See Edward Wyatt, F.C.C. Revisits Net Neutrality Exemption for Mobile Broadband, N.Y. Times
(Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/technology/fcc-revisits-net-neutrality-exemptionfor-mobile-broadband.html?_r=0.
255. Aaron Smith, Pew Research Ctr., Smartphone Ownership (2013); see also U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., Exploring the Digital Nation: Embracing the
Mobile Internet (2014).
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with different devices. Consider, moreover, that the FCC is considering
256
applying the 25 Mbps speed threshold to wireless.
4.

Community Broadband for Everyone

Finally, the fourth way in which federal policymakers have helped to
redress broadband service disparities is by supporting efforts to operate
or otherwise support broadband service by municipal governments.
Private providers are an essential piece of the federal government’s
advocacy of deployment and adoption. But they are not the only ones
capable of delivering high-speed service to residents. Local governments
across the country, too, have been developing or supporting broadband
in their communities in cooperation with local anchor institutions and
257
major stakeholders. Widely touted projects in Chattanooga, Tennessee
and Wilson, North Carolina, for example, provide extremely high-speed
one gigabit service to their residents at relatively competitive subscription
258
rates. The former repurposed existing electricity infrastructure in ways
259
that have since inspired other cities and towns. These services now are
so fast and reliable that they rival anything else offered by local providers
at the same rate, and has even drawn the interest of neighboring rural
communities.
Policymakers at the local and federal levels today advocate
community broadband projects because those are generally the most
effective ways of diversifying service options in communities with just
260
one or two providers. Municipal service creates competition for
broadband where there sometimes is little to none. Competition in the
local market for service, they argue, stimulates innovation and investment
in broadband infrastructure and generally inures to the benefit of local
residents irrespective of how isolated their region may be. And, indeed,
there are strong indications already that in every locality in which cities
and towns have pursued municipal projects alone, or in partnership with
a major stakeholder like Google Fiber, service providers have responded
261
by offering comparable or near-comparable service.

256. See Press Release, FCC, FCC Launches Inquiry for Annual Broadband Progress Report
(Aug. 6, 2015) (on file with author).
257. See Sylvain, supra note 108; Sharon E. Gillett et al., Telecommunications Policy
Research Conference, Local Government Broadband Initiatives 11 (Sept. 18, 2003).
258. Nestor Davidson & Olivier Sylvain, Cross Country: An Old Tobacco Town Battles over
Smokin’ Fast Broadband, Wall St. J. (Sept. 5, 2014, 6:38 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nestordavidson-and-olivier-sylvain-an-old-tobacco-town-battles-over-smokin-fast-broadband-1409956682.
259. See, e.g., David Talbot et al., Berkman Ctr., Holyoke: A Massachusetts Municipal Light
Plant Seizes Internet Access Business Opportunities (2015).
260. Jon Brodkin, Fed Up, US Cities Take Steps to Build Better Broadband, ArsTechnica (Oct. 27, 2014,
6:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/business/2014/10/fed-up-us-cities-try-to-build-better-broadband/.
261. See Jeff Baumgartner, AT&T Takes on Google Fiber in K.C., Multichannel News (Feb. 17,
2015, 9:36 AM), http://www.multichannel.com/news/technology/att-takes-google-fiber-kc/388021.
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Consistent with this vision, the President announced a new program
late in 2014, BroadbandUSA, to promote municipal broadband by offering
technical assistance to interested communities and publishing guidelines
262
on infrastructure planning, financing, construction, and operations. In
this regard, their advocacy of municipal broadband coheres with the broad
policy objective of the Open Internet Rules to promote deployment.
Local projects to provide broadband service could remedy racial,
ethnic, and income disparities because those factors are so closely related
263
to residency. But such laws face a significant obstacle in states that
prohibit or significantly curtail municipalities’ legal authority to enter the
264
market for service. At least nineteen states have such laws. Proponents
of these restrictions argue, among other things, that municipal participation
in the market for broadband service would undermine competition rather
than encourage it because governments do not have to bear the same
risks or pay the same operational costs and taxes as private corporations.
They also argue that some municipal broadband projects are mismanaged.
In any case, the FCC recently approved an application from Wilson
and Chattanooga to preempt state laws in North Carolina and Tennessee
265
that prevent them from offering broadband service to local residents.
Over the objection of providers from all over the country, the agency
cited its authority under Section 706 of the amended Communications
266
Act to remove barriers to infrastructure development. Congress, too,
may intervene. The Senate is currently considering a bill that would
amend the Communications Act to bar states from blocking municipal
267
broadband. The FCC’s action here is in furtherance of competition in
the market for broadband service. But it also advances the distributional
concerns at the heart of the Communications Act to the extent it assumes
all communities have a stake in ensuring its residents have high quality
access to broadband.

262. See Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Broadband That
Works: Promoting Competition and Local Choice in Next-Generation Connectivity (Jan. 13, 2015) (on
file with author).
263. Crow, supra note 21.
264. Sylvain, supra note 108, at 795.
265. See Press Release, FCC, FCC Finds FCC Grants Petitions to Preempt State Laws Restricting
Community Broadband in North Carolina, Tennessee (Feb. 26, 2015) (on file with author).
266. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2015). The agency might also rely on its authority under a separate provision of
the Communications Act under Title II to ensure that states do not impose rules that “prohibit or have the
effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide” service. 47 U.S.C. § 253 (1996).
267. Brian Fung, Cory Booker’s Introducing a Bill to Help Cities Build Their Own, Public Internet
Services, Wash. Post (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2015/01/21/
cory-bookers-introducing-a-bill-to-help-cities-build-their-own-public-internet-services/.
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C. New Possibilities
A reorientation toward redressing disparities in broadband
deployment, adoption, and use could have significant implications for
policymakers and scholars in a variety of other policy areas and ways
today. The next Subparts briefly explore some of these implications in the
specific contexts of housing and disparate law enforcement and surveillance.
1.

Housing and Broadband Use Patterns

Consider housing policy. The intersection of residential segregation
and broadband use has not been significantly studied by social scientists,
legal scholars, or policymakers. But this intersection should be studied
because such service patterns also track longstanding patterns of racial
segregation in housing and, accordingly, correspond with the very
268
problems to which fair housing laws are addressed. Indeed, in the wake
of the Supreme Court’s recent decision to affirm disparate impact rules
269
under the Fair Housing Act, federal officials have recently elaborated
existing rules against housing segregation and expanded the number of
resources they will devote to enforce such rules in recognition that
residential housing patterns entrench a range of other structural
270
disadvantages.
So, apart from attending to policy interventions that promote the
same treatment of wireless and wired devices or that protect municipal
broadband, federal communications policymakers could also help to
redress racial disparities in Internet access and use by aligning federal
civil rights laws addressed to residential housing patterns with residential
271
Current statutory and regulatory
broadband service patterns.
authorities do not provide legal remedies to broadband subscribers
against providers. Yet, fair housing laws suggest that, first, authorities
should provide legal remedies, and, second––and just as importantly––
that local, state, and federal agencies might be complicit in furthering
disparities in access along racial lines if they do not act to prevent it.
Government policies on municipal franchising of cable broadband
service, for example, arguably frustrate nondiscrimination norms in fair
housing law if they further entrench racial disparities. This intuition

268. See supra Part II.B.1.
269. See Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
270. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Binyamin Appelbaum, Obama Unveils Stricter Rules Against
Segregation in Housing, N.Y. Times (July 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/us/hud-issuingnew-rules-to-fight-segregation.html.
271. Here and elsewhere, I have written about the significant correlation between geography and
the quality of broadband service. See Sylvain, supra note 108.
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would have much to learn from and contribute to the rich scholarship on
272
redressing inequality in housing policy.
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”)
seems to appreciate the important overlap between housing patterns and
broadband access levels. In the past year, it has initiated an endeavor in
collaboration with nonprofits and private actors to extend affordable
broadband access to families living in HUD-assisted housing in twenty273
seven cities and one tribal area across the country. HUD has launched,
moreover, a related demonstration project to measure the reach and
274
impact of broadband connectivity in public housing.
2.

Disparate Law Enforcement Surveillance and Broadband Use

Such an approach might also cause scholars and policymakers to
more consistently examine the ways in which the scope of privacy
protection varies among the demographic groups, tracking the historically
entrenched demographic fault line of race, for example. Scholars might
begin to study, for example, how, if at all, race, ethnicity, and class
interact with electronic surveillance practices of mobile device by law
enforcement. Media reports already strongly suggest that the public
social media accounts of prepubescent, teenage, and young adult Black
275
men are disproportionately surveilled by law enforcement officials.
Focus on these questions and patterns would have much to learn from
276
scholarship on privacy law and the disparate uses of networked devices.
In any event, findings on these questions could have implications for a
whole set of scholarly and regulatory interventions.
D. Equality’s Limits
In spite of the substantial gains that the equality framing offers, full
and equal user participation has its limits and pitfalls, too. First,
Congress’s charge to the FCC to ensure reasonably comparable service
to all Americans does not require that all Americans actually do the
same things or even good things when they go online. Nor must users be
equally entrepreneurial or sociable once they are online. Rather, as
ambitious as the goal of universality is, the statutory command is limited

272. See, e.g., Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Directives in
American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1339, 1339 (2012).
273. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., President Obama and Secretary Castro
Announce Initiative to Extend High Speed Broadband Access for Students in HUD-Assisted Housing
(July 15, 2015) (on file with author).
274. Housing and Urban Development Notice, 80 Fed. Reg. 18248 (Apr. 3, 2015).
275. Rose Hackman, Is the Online Surveillance of Black Teenagers the New Stop-and-Frisk?, Guardian
(Apr. 23, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/23/online-surveillance-blackteenagers-new-stop-and-frisk.
276. See, e.g., Napoli & Obar, supra note 18, at 326.
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to ensuring that high-quality broadband service is available to all
277
Americans.
For starters, users will have to go online. Many, however, just
choose to stay disconnected out of defiance. There is little that
communications policy can do on its face to require engagement. Indeed,
there are good reasons users might choose not to be engaged, in so far as
that choice is well informed.
It is not at all clear, moreover, that everyone who is underserved or
unserved will do much once they are online. We already know, for
example, that users have varying degrees of “digital readiness.”
According to one prominent report, nearly one-third of Americans self
report low levels of knowledge of and confidence in using computers or
278
finding information online. Around twenty percent of Americans,
moreover, report low levels of digital readiness even though they have
279
broadband at home. And about one-eighth of American households do
not subscribe to broadband because they do not think the Internet is
280
relevant to their lives. So, irrespective of the range of new applications
and services that will be at their disposal, particularly after the FCC
implements the reforms I outline above, many users will continue to stay
disconnected.
For those who do choose to connect, however, it is not at all clear
that they will have the ambition to do more than interact in the most
superficial or ephemeral ways. And, in any event, dangers await users
nearly everywhere online. To begin, there are myriad incursions on
privacy and consumer sovereignty that all users experience when they go
281
online. But, in addition to these routine costs of online participation,
historically disadvantaged groups are likely to confront a variation of the
same obstacles and problems they experience in the physical world. The
forms of racial bias in real estate and on the job market in the physical
world, for example, are also likely to appear on the Internet. Consider
Airbnb, the social networking service that enables people to rent out
their homes to strangers. White users of the service generally earn twelve
282
percent more than Black users. Or consider that, a couple years ago,

277. It is worth noting here that the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce have launched
training and grant programs for people and institutions interested in improving digital readiness. See
Community Connect Grants, U. S. Dep’t of Agric., http://www.rd.usda.gov/programs-services/communityconnect-grants (last visited Feb. 8, 2016); see also DigitalLiteracy.gov, http://www.digitalliteracy.gov
(last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
278. Horrigan, supra note 123, at 2.
279. Zickuhr & Smith, supra note 22.
280. Id.; see also supra Part II.B.1.
281. Pasquale, supra note 93, at 14345; Ohm, supra note 92.
282. Benjamin Edelman & Michael Luca, Digital Discrimination: The Case of Airbnb.com, (Harvard
Bus. Sch., Working Paper 14-054). Rating systems on share sites like Airbnb and Uber, for example,

I - Sylvain_17 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete)

February 2016]

NETWORK EQUALITY

2/9/2016 1:42 PM

497

search terms on Google that included Black-identified names generated
advertisements suggestive of an arrest of a person with that name at an
283
alarmingly high rate. Or consider that new forms of Internet data
mining might introduce new forms of employment discrimination—
discrimination that is not easily accounted for under existing civil rights
284
laws. Or consider that baseball cards or iPhones sell for significantly
more when the hand showcasing the items in the listing photograph on
285
an online shopping forum is White rather than Black. We might also
suspect that improvements in broadband access could increase
opportunities for law enforcement, insurance companies, creditors, and
others to survey or collect information about historically disadvantaged
communities in ways that perpetuate existing biases and structures of
discrimination.
All of these developments suggest that the pivot toward distributional
concerns and equality in broadband policymaking could not have come
any sooner. Presumably it means that policymakers will now attend to
disparity and discrimination online in the same ways they have in the
286
These developments also suggest an agenda for
physical world.
scholarship in communications and information law that is far less
preoccupied with innovation for its own sake.
Conclusion
Communications scholars and policymakers have been myopically
focused on promoting Internet innovation. They do so at the expense of
the core distributional objectives of communications law. It is time they
break free from their innovation fixation, and do the hard work of
considering how everyone, including and especially members of historically
marginalized groups, engage and participate in the Internet’s rich
affordances. Scholars and policymakers must now ensure that law and
policy affirmatively further substantive broadband equality. This Article
provides a theoretical and positive legal roadmap for this work, which is
an essential first step in redressing ongoing racial and income disparities
that continue to mark our society.

might also skew against Blacks. See Nancy Leong, The Sharing Economy Has a Race Problem, Salon
(Nov. 2, 2014, 3:58 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/11/02/the_sharing_economy_has_a_race_problem/.
283. See Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery 4 (Harvard Univ., 2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2208240.
284. See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 Calif. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2016) (on file with author).
285. See Ian Ayres et al., Race Effects on Ebay 22–23 (Sept. 27, 2011),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1934432&download=yes; see also Jennifer L.
Doleac & Luke C.D. Stein, The Visible Hand: Race and Online Market Outcomes, 123 Econ. J. F469,
F490–91 (2013).
286. Cf. Keats Citron, supra note 29, at 66.
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